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“On Behalf of Each Child”: Section 1983
Enforcement of the Right to Foster Care
Maintenance Payments under the Child
Welfare Act
Parker C. Eudy†
In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
(CWA). As a piece of Spending Clause legislation, the CWA imposes upon states numerous conditions in exchange for federal funding. One of these conditions is that
states must make foster care maintenance payments to foster caregivers “on behalf
of each child” who qualifies for assistance. Because the CWA does not include a federal mechanism for reviewing individual claims, foster caregivers seeking to compel
their state to make adequate foster care maintenance payments have resorted to suing under 42 USC § 1983. However, since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of § 1983, holding that private individuals may enforce only constitutional and statutory rights, not benefits, under § 1983. Due to ambiguity in the
Court’s opinions, a circuit split has emerged over whether a foster caregiver may
enforce the right to foster care maintenance payments on behalf of the foster child
under his or her care.
This Comment argues that the CWA creates an enforceable right to foster care
maintenance payments under § 1983 by analyzing the CWA’s text and structure and
by drawing on the context of the Act’s enactment and subsequent legislative history.
The circuit courts have overlooked several aspects of the CWA’s text and structure
that indicate Congress’s intent to create an enforceable right. Moreover, the circuit
courts have almost exclusively analyzed the text of the CWA, ignoring aspects of the
CWA’s enactment and later pieces of legislative history that provide further signs of
congressional intent to create an enforceable right. Lastly, this Comment concludes
that § 1983 enforcement of foster care maintenance payments furthers the legislative
purpose of the CWA. By ensuring that foster caregivers are adequately supported to
provide care throughout the entire duration of a child’s placement in foster care,
§ 1983 enforcement reduces the likelihood that a foster child is shuffled between foster homes for indefinite periods of time.

†

BA 2014, Rice University; JD Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law

School.

1719

1720

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:1719

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1720
I. CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION AND SECTION 1983 ENFORCEMENT ............ 1723
A. Child Welfare Legislation: A Brief History ...................................... 1724
B. From Implied Causes of Action to § 1983 Actions ........................... 1729
C. Section 1983 Enforcement following Thiboutot ............................... 1732
1. The Supreme Court took a liberal approach toward § 1983
enforcement in the 1980s ........................................................... 1733
2. The Supreme Court began to limit the scope of § 1983 following
Wright and Wilder in the 1990s, and Congress responded ...... 1735
3. The Supreme Court’s current approach to § 1983 actions ....... 1737
II. FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS: A PRIVATELY ENFORCEABLE
RIGHT? ........................................................................................................ 1740
A. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits: The CWA Focuses on Protecting
Individual Rights ............................................................................... 1741
B. The Eighth Circuit: The CWA Focuses on Regulating States ........ 1744
III. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS .......... 1746
A. Rereading the CWA for Rights-Creating Language and an Individual
Focus under Gonzaga ........................................................................ 1746
1. The structure of the CWA addresses individual foster caregivers
and state compliance separately ............................................... 1750
2. The text of § 672 employs rights-creating language................. 1758
B. Contextualizing the CWA ................................................................. 1761
1. Foster care maintenance payments and the CWA’s purpose .. 1762
2. Criticisms of expansive § 1983 enforcement ............................. 1765
3. The CWA’s enactment in the context of § 1983 cases and the
CWA’s legislative history ........................................................... 1769
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 1773

INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act1 (CWA), which added Title IV-E to the Social Security
Act2 (SSA). The purpose of the CWA was to enable states to
establish foster care and transitional independent living
programs for eligible children and to provide adoption assistance
for children with special needs.3 Passed under Congress’s
Spending Clause power,4 the CWA gives each state the option of

1

Pub L No 96-272, 94 Stat 500 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 670 et seq.
49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as amended at 42 USC § 301 et seq. The CWA amended
Title IV-B of the SSA.
3
42 USC § 670.
4
See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 376 (6th Cir 2017); Midwest Foster Care and
Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir 2013). See also US Const
Art 1, § 8, cl 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
2
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creating its own foster care system in compliance with certain
conditions in exchange for federal funding. Any state choosing to
opt into the federal program must submit to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services a state plan that satisfies a list of
requirements for approval.5 For example, because family
preservation and reunification were major goals of the CWA,6 one
of these requirements is that states make “reasonable efforts . . .
to preserve and reunify families.”7 Upon approval by the
Secretary, states become eligible to receive federal funding.8
The CWA also mandates that states with approved plans
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of qualifying
children.9 These payments must be provided to each child’s foster
caregiver,10 and they are intended to cover the costs of, among
other things, food, clothing, and shelter.11 Because the CWA does
not explicitly provide aggrieved parties with a private right of action to compel states to provide adequate foster care maintenance
payments, foster caregivers have resorted to suing under 42 USC
§ 1983.12 In recent years, three circuit courts have diverged over
whether the CWA creates a statutory right to foster care maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983.13
The stakes are high for many foster caregivers and foster
children. With over 420,000 children living in foster care,14 ensuring that states provide adequate assistance to foster caregivers is

and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States. . . .”).
5
See 42 USC § 671(a).
6
See text accompanying notes 51–54. See also John E.B. Myers, A Short History of
Child Protection in America, 42 Fam L Q 449, 459 (2008) (“The effort to preserve families—
called family preservation—was a key component of [the CWA], and the dominant paradigm of child protection in the 1980s.”).
7
42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B).
8
42 USC § 671(a).
9
42 USC § 672(a).
10 42 USC § 672(b).
11 42 USC § 675(4)(A) (defining “foster care maintenance payments” and stipulating
the costs that such payments should cover).
12 Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute” deprives a citizen “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 USC § 1983.
13 Compare Midwest Foster, 712 F3d at 1203 (holding that the CWA does not confer
a right to foster care maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983), with
Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81 (holding that the CWA confers a right to foster care
maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983); California State Foster Parent
Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010) (same).
14 Foster Care Statistics 2015 *4 (Children’s Bureau, March 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/R8JY-EWA2.
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vital. If § 1983 actions are not available to compel states to make
adequate foster care maintenance payments, foster caregivers
will have few alternatives to force their states to comply. Another
remedy for a state’s noncompliance would be for foster caregivers
to ask the federal government to terminate funding to their
state.15 Such a drastic move is rare16 and would likely devastate
any state’s foster care system and ultimately harm foster caregivers and foster children.17 However, consistent failure by states in
providing adequate foster care maintenance payments may result
in multiple placements for more foster children and exacerbate
“foster care drift” because fewer foster caregivers would be able to
provide care for the entire duration of a foster child’s removal.18
These systemic problems severely hinder efforts toward family reunification and permanency for foster children.19
This Comment argues that the CWA’s text, structure, purpose, and legislative history unambiguously affirm that Congress
intended the CWA to create a right to foster care maintenance
payments that is enforceable under § 1983. Part I delves into the
history of child welfare legislation in the United States and highlights several pivotal developments that ultimately led to the
CWA. Part I also maps the evolution of § 1983 actions as a vehicle
for enforcing federal statutory rights. Part II summarizes the reasoning of the circuit courts that have addressed whether the CWA
confers an enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments
under § 1983. Finally, Part III argues that the text and structure
of the CWA’s foster care maintenance payment provisions closely

15

See text accompanying notes 291–92.
See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of
a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 Colum L Rev 1838, 1859 (2003) (“Empirical
data show [that] . . . [f]ederal agency action following state noncompliance is a rarity.”).
17 See id at 1839 (explaining that asking the federal government to eliminate funding
to one’s state program would not ensure compliance and would further “cripple” the
program).
18 For a discussion of the impacts of “multiple placements” on foster children and the
foster care system, see Melissa J. Dorris, Federal Oversight and Private Actions:
Maintaining a Balance in Rights Enforcement of Federal Child Welfare Legislation, 23
Children’s Legal Rts J 23, 32–33 (2003) (identifying multiple placements as one of the
problems plaguing the foster care system and suggesting that “litigation may be the means
necessary to achieve broad sweeping reform”). See also text accompanying notes 306–08.
See also Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Implementation of the Federal Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Juvenile & Fam Ct J 3, 4 & n 19 (1994) (defining
“foster care drift” as “the situation of children lost in the child welfare system who move
from placement to placement without ever achieving permanency”). See also text
accompanying notes 42–45.
19 See text accompanying notes 295–308.
16
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resemble statutory provisions that the Supreme Court has found
create a right that is enforceable under § 1983 for reasons the
circuit courts have not addressed. Part III ends by contending
that § 1983 actions further the CWA’s purpose by reducing the
likelihood of foster care drift and that the context of the CWA’s
enactment and later legislative history strongly indicate that
Congress intended the CWA to create a right to foster care
maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983.
I. CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION AND SECTION 1983
ENFORCEMENT
Although the origins of 42 USC § 1983 trace back to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,20 it was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court
declared that federal statutory rights could be enforced under
§ 1983.21 However, § 1983 actions had already proliferated during
the 1960s and 1970s to enforce a variety of federal welfare provisions.22 During the same period, Congress passed significant
pieces of legislation that made major changes to the foster care
system.23 Since the passage of the CWA in 1980, § 1983 actions
have remained the primary vehicle utilized by foster caregivers
to compel states to provide foster care maintenance payments in
accordance with the CWA.24
Part I.A chronicles some of the key historical developments in
child welfare legislation and the public policy shifts that ultimately
led Congress to pass the CWA. Part I.B recounts the origin and
growth of § 1983 actions as a means for enforcing federal laws up
until 1980, noting that the use of § 1983 actions to enforce provisions of the SSA had become commonplace by the time Congress
enacted the CWA. Part I.C analyzes several pivotal cases spanning
from the early 1980s to 2000s in which the Supreme Court developed a multifactor test to determine if a provision of Spending
Clause legislation creates an enforceable right under § 1983.
20 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat 13. Section 1983 emerged as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, “which attempted to deal with widespread legal abuses and physical
violence, often backed by the Ku Klux Klan, against Southern Blacks and their white supporters.” Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482, 484 (1982).
21 See Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4–6 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and
the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U Chi L Rev 394, 394–95 (1982).
22 See note 79 and accompanying text.
23 See notes 30–41 and accompanying text.
24 See Dorris, 23 Children’s Legal Rts J at 28–33 (cited in note 18) (summarizing
cases in which plaintiffs have sought enforcement of the CWA’s provisions under § 1983).
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Child Welfare Legislation: A Brief History

The earliest institutional efforts in the United States to care
for children whose parents could not adequately care for them
date back to the early nineteenth century. Led by private and religious organizations, these efforts resulted in the creation of
some of the country’s first orphanages and almshouses for the
poor.25 By the 1850s, the poor living conditions of children in these
facilities spurred the development of new methods of providing
care for dependent children.26 Reform-minded organizations, such
as the Children’s Aid Society in New York, were founded with the
goal of establishing local and statewide agencies to place orphaned children in the homes of families for temporary periods,
giving rise to the “foster home movement.”27 This Section explores
how the relationship between the federal government and states
has evolved over time with respect to administering child welfare
services.
Most early child welfare agencies were subsidized and regulated by the states. In 1935, with the enactment of the SSA, the
federal government became more extensively involved in administering assistance to states for child welfare services.28 Title IV
of the SSA provided federal matching grants to help states create
and manage their own child welfare agencies to care for dependent children living in fatherless and impoverished homes. This
25 See Kasia O’Neill Murray and Sarah Gesiriech, A Brief Legislative History of the
Child Welfare System *1 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Nov 1, 2004), archived at
http://perma.cc/7K9N-UXVY; Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights
181–82 (Harvard 2005).
26 See Brenda G. McGowan, Historical Evolution of Child Welfare Services, in Gerald
P. Mallon and Peg McCartt Hess, eds, Child Welfare for the Twentieth-First Century: A
Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 10, 13–15 (Columbia 2005).
27 Id at 14–15.
28 Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 182 (cited in note 25).
However, the federal government was involved in other forms of child welfare prior to
the enactment of the SSA. The most prominent example of the federal government’s
involvement in this arena was the United States Children’s Bureau, which was established in 1912 and which initially dedicated its efforts to reducing infant mortality. During the early twentieth century, “the Bureau expanded its efforts to include research
and standard-setting in the areas of child labor, juvenile delinquency, mothers’ aid, illegitimacy, child welfare, and child health.” The Children Bureau’s Legacy: Ensuring
the Right to Childhood *28 (Children’s Bureau, Apr 1, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/CC3E-RF7H. Prior to the enactment of the SSA, the Children’s Bureau
encouraged states to reform their adoption and foster care laws, and it ultimately played
a key role in drafting provisions of the SSA related to child welfare. Moreover, it was
responsible for distributing federal grants-in-aid to states under the newly enacted legislation. See id at *62. See also US Children’s Bureau (The Adoption History Project),
archived at http://perma.cc/W666-YVT3.
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federal program is now known as the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program.29 However, initially this
program did not authorize states to use federal grant money to
provide assistance to foster caregivers even if a foster child would
have otherwise qualified for aid.
Federal aid to states did not cover foster care services until
the 1960s,30 and in the decade that followed, the federal government began to play an increasingly prominent role in shaping
state-provided child welfare services.31 Congress amended the
SSA in 1961 to give states the option of using federal aid to provide payments to foster caregivers under what became known as
the AFDC-FC program.32 In 1968, Congress made the AFDC-FC
program mandatory for states to receive AFDC funding.33 As the
federal government expanded the number of children eligible to
receive reimbursable welfare services, the amount of money flowing into states increased.34 In effect, “By attaching conditions to
the receipt of considerable federal dollars that paid for the out-ofhome placement of children, Congress has been able to persuade
every state to conform its child welfare laws with federal law.”35
The expansion of child welfare services during the 1960s was
driven by public attitudes about the harmful effects of poverty on
the living conditions and well-being of children.36 But by the
1970s, public support for welfare programs aimed at assisting minorities and the poor began to sour.37 This led many lawmakers
and foster care advocates to reframe policy rationales for expanding and improving foster care not as efforts to address poverty but

29 McGowan, Historical Evolution at 26 (cited in note 26). See also Irene Lurie, Major
Changes in the Structure of the AFDC since 1935, 59 Cornell L Rev 825, 826 (1974).
30 See Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America’s
Disposable Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to
Present, 29 J of Legis 51, 55 (2003).
31 Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 183–85 (cited in note 25).
32 See Act of May 8, 1961, Pub L No 87-31, § 2, 75 Stat 76. See also Sanders, 29 J of
Legis at 56–57 (cited in note 30).
33 Act of Jan 2, 1968, Pub L No 90-248, § 208(a), 81 Stat 892. See also Lurie, 59
Cornell L Rev at 827–28 (cited in note 29) (chronicling the legislative changes to the AFDC
program during the 1960s).
34 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *2–3
(cited in note 25).
35 See Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 183–84 (cited in note 25).
36 See Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 57–58 (cited in note 30).
37 See Judith M. Gueron, Welfare and Poverty: The Elements of Reform, 11 Yale L &
Pol Rev 113, 124 (1993) (attributing shifts in the public’s attitude toward welfare programs
to growing “public anger at a welfare system that seem[ed] to provide people with a longterm alternative to work”).
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rather as efforts to “protect” children and to ensure “safety” from
abuse and neglect.38 This rhetorical shift gave rise to what some
have dubbed the “child rescue philosophy,”39 which produced new
federal legislation premised on the belief that many children were
living in unsafe homes with families unfit to care for them and
that foster care placement was the best way to help solve this
problem.40 Regardless of the justifications for expanding child
welfare programming, legislation from the early 1960s to mid1970s invariably led to foster care programs with funding structures that were “aimed at sustaining children in care and not at
moving children out of the foster care system.”41
By the late 1970s, concerns emerged that too many children
were being removed from their homes unnecessarily.42 Once children entered the foster care system, they were often shuffled from
one foster home to another and subjected to “perpetual states of
familial uncertainty.”43 Many lawmakers and child welfare advocates began to view this phenomenon, which was coined “foster
care drift,” as the most pressing problem facing children in the
foster care system.44 Congress realized that the funding structure
of previous AFDC-FC legislation was partly to blame.45
In 1980, Congress passed the CWA to address these mounting issues. In addition to creating Title IV-E of the SSA, the CWA
transferred the AFDC-FC program to the new title.46 The CWA
left intact the federal funding mechanism for the AFDC-FC program, but it imposed upon states new conditions that they must

38

See Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 184–85 (cited in note 25).
See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 Fordham L
Rev 2285, 2290 (1998).
40 See, for example, Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), Pub L No
93-247, 88 Stat 4 (1974), codified as amended in various sections of Title 42.
41 Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 56–57 (cited in note 30).
42 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *3 (cited
in note 25).
43 Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 61 (cited in note 30). See also Michael J. Bufkin, Note,
The “Reasonable Efforts” Requirement: Does It Place Children at Increased Risk of Abuse
or Neglect?, 35 U Louisville J Fam L 355, 357 (1996) (stating that the “average foster child
spen[t] time in three or four homes”).
44 See Bailie, 66 Fordham L Rev at 2289 (cited in note 39). See also Smith v
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 837–38 & n 41 (1977).
45 See Martin Guggenheim, Book Review, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the
Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv L Rev 1716, 1726–27 (2000).
46 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *3 (cited
in note 25).
39
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satisfy to continue receiving federal funding for foster care services.47 Unlike in previous legislation, states were now required
to implement procedural safeguards, such as active case management, periodic foster care placement reviews throughout the duration of each child’s placement in foster care, and long-term permanency planning for moving children out of foster care.48 The
CWA also required states to establish an adoption assistance program for children.49
By discouraging unwarranted removals and encouraging reunification and permanent placement in a timely manner, the
CWA aimed to reduce foster care drift.50 The CWA was largely
built on the “family preservation philosophy,” which “has as its
starting point the belief that a child’s biological family is the
placement of first preference.”51 Ultimately, the goal of the CWA
was to create stable and permanent living environments for children and to avoid lengthy removals.52 The CWA requires that, in
order for states to receive funding for foster care services, they
must make “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal of children
from their homes before placing them in foster care.53 After removing children from their homes, states are required to make
reasonable efforts to “reunify” children and their families to prevent indefinite periods of foster placement and foster care drift.54

47 See id at *3–4 (explaining that the CWA was the “first time [that Congress]
established a major federal role in the administration and oversight of child welfare
services” and listing several major changes to prior child welfare services under the AFDCFC program).
48 See 42 USC §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5), 675a(a)(1)–(3).
49 See 42 USC §§ 673–673b.
50 See Sara J. Klein, Note, Protecting the Rights of Children: Suing Under § 1983 to
Enforce Federal Child Welfare Law, 26 Cardozo L Rev 2611, 2619–20 (2005) (“In response
to . . . the growing number of children who were lingering in foster care for many years,
Congress passed the [CWA]. The CWA focused on reducing the number of children in foster care by preserving and reuniting families whenever possible.”) (citations omitted).
51 See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases:
Ten Years Later, 26 Cal W L Rev 223, 255 (1990).
52 When a child is removed from his or her family and reunification becomes unsuitable, the CWA includes provisions to ensure swift placement with an adoptive family. See
Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 58 (cited in note 30).
53 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B).
54 See 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B) (stating that “reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families . . . to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s
home”). See also David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State
Child Welfare System, 54 U Pitt L Rev 139, 158–59 (1992) (“Children caught in foster care
drift are neither returned to their parents’ home nor freed for placement in adoptive
homes.”).
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Like other SSA programs, the CWA functions as a federalstate cooperative, and states that do not opt into the program
forgo all federal funding for foster care services. Section 671(a)
directs that, “[i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments
[from the federal government,] . . . it shall have a plan approved
by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services].”55 State plans
are subject to periodic review by the secretary, and to remain compliant, a state program must be in “substantial conformity” with
the requirements in § 671.56 The first listed requirement is to “provide[ ] for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with
section 672.”57
Section 672 explains how each state must implement its foster care maintenance payment program, and § 675(4)(A) defines
what the payments must cover. Section 672 explicitly mandates
that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child
who has been removed from the home of a relative.”58 Although
foster families and childcare institutions are the recipients of foster care maintenance payments, eligibility for payments is tied to
the circumstances of the foster child.59 The eligibility criteria
“closely track[ ]” those of the AFDC-FC program, which are based
on the financial needs and income level of a child’s parent(s) prior
to removal.60 Thus, not all foster children are eligible for having
payments made on their behalf. Finally, § 675(4)(A), which is located in the CWA’s definitional section, defines foster care
maintenance payments as payments intended to cover “the cost
of . . . food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, . . .
[and] reasonable travel to the child’s home for visitation.”61
Because the CWA lacks any mechanism for reviewing
individual claims,62 foster caregivers have resorted to bringing

55

42 USC § 671(a).
42 USC §§ 1320a–1322a(a).
57 42 USC § 671(a)(1).
58 42 USC § 672(a)(1).
59 See 42 USC § 672(c) (defining “foster family home” and “child-care institution”).
60 House Committee on Ways and Means, Child Welfare: Legislative History, in
Green Book: Background Material and Data on the Programs within the Jurisdiction of
the Committee on Ways and Means *5 (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/CW43-EZ8Z
(“2011 Green Book”). See also 42 USC § 672(a)(1)(B); 42 USC § 672(a)(3).
61 42 USC § 675(4)(A).
62 See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 380 (6th Cir 2017); Midwest Foster Care and
Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1202 (8th Cir 2013); California State Foster
Parent Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010). The only exceptions are 42
USC § 671(a)(18)(A), which prohibits states from “deny[ing] to any person the opportunity
56
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private causes of action under § 1983 to enforce the right to foster
care maintenance payments.63 In some cases, foster caregivers
allege that their state has failed to make payments even though
their foster child meets the eligibility requirements.64 In others,
foster caregivers may receive foster care maintenance payments
but allege that the payments inadequately cover the costs
enumerated in § 675(4)(A).65 While some courts have authorized
foster caregivers to sue under § 1983 to compel their state to
comply with § 672 and § 675(4), other courts have found that the
statutory language and structure of these provisions foreclose
§ 1983 actions.66
B.

From Implied Causes of Action to § 1983 Actions

The Court’s § 1983 doctrine underwent massive changes
around the same time the CWA was enacted, and it has continued
to evolve ever since. Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person
who, under color of any statute” deprives a citizen “of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”67
The Supreme Court did not affirm the availability of § 1983 actions for plaintiffs alleging violations of constitutional rights until
1961.68 As for violations of purely federal statutory rights—in the
absence of constitutional claims—the Court did not affirm the
availability of § 1983 actions until 1980.69 This Section discusses
the rise of § 1983 actions during the 1960s and 1970s, which
roughly coincided with the decline of implied causes of action.

to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin
of the person, or of the child, involved,” and 42 USC § 671(a)(18)(B), which prohibits states
from “delay[ing] or deny[ing] the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child,
involved.”
63 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “private right of action” as “[a]n individual’s right
to sue in a personal capacity to enforce a legal claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1520 (West
10th ed 2014).
64 See, for example, Glisson, 847 F3d at 376.
65 See, for example, Wagner, 624 F3d at 976–77.
66 See Part II.
67 42 USC § 1983.
68 See Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 171 (1961) (holding that an “[a]llegation of facts
constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of [42 USC § 1983]”).
69 See Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4–6 (1980).
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For over half a century starting in 1916,70 federal courts generally found an implied private cause of action for a plaintiff injured by the violation of a federal statute or constitutional provision so long as the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons
that the statutory or constitutional provision was meant to protect.71 This judicial power to create private causes of action was
derived from common law doctrine and provided litigants with access to federal courts.72 By the 1960s, courts were frequently reading implied causes of action into federal laws in which an express
right was absent as a means of guaranteeing that statutes were
implemented effectively.73 In 1964, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the power of courts to fashion private remedies for the violation
of federal statutes, holding that “it is the duty of the courts” to
provide “remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose” of federal laws.74 And again, in 1975, the Supreme
Court affirmed that courts could read implied causes of action
into federal statutes and enunciated a four-part test for determining whether a statute creates an implied right of action.75
Over the course of several cases in the late 1970s,76 the
Supreme Court became increasingly reluctant to find implied
70 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 412–13 (cited in note 21). For the case in which the
federal doctrine of implied rights of action originated, see Texas & Pacific Railway v
Rigsby, 241 US 33, 39 (1916) (“A disregard of . . . the statute is a wrongful act, and where
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied.”).
71 See John H. Bauman, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 Stan L Rev
1243, 1243 (1978) (stating that the function of “[t]he implied cause of action doctrine [was
to] allow[ ] courts to create civil remedies without express legislative permission”); Tamar
Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va L Rev 553, 555–56 (1981) (discussing the judicial
power to create private rights of action).
72 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 411–12 (cited in note 21) (citations omitted):

At common law, private persons injured by violation of state statutes were generally permitted to bring suit in state court to seek redress if they belonged to
the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. The federal courts, exercising the common law powers recognized in Swift v Tyson, used this rationale
to create private rights of action for violations of federal laws.
73 See Patrick B. Fazzone, Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation:
Harmonization within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 Duke L J 928, 930 (describing the “liberal approach” of courts during this time).
74 J.I. Case Co v Borak, 377 US 426, 433 (1975).
75 See Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 78 (1975).
76 See, for example, Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 570 (1979) (finding
that § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implied no private cause of action);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc v Lewis, 444 US 11, 19–24 (1979) (finding that one
provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 implied a private cause of action but that
other provisions merely proscribed certain state actions without implying a private cause
of action). See also Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 413 (cited in note 21) (explaining that, in
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causes of action under federal statutes due to its “concern with
the separation-of-powers aspects of such implied remedies.”77
Meanwhile, claims for violations of constitutional rights brought
under § 1983 proliferated.78 Many plaintiffs sought redress in federal court under § 1983 for state violations of various provisions
of the SSA, including provisions pertaining to foster payments
through the AFDC-FC program.79 Although cases during this period typically included constitutional claims, which “provid[ed] a
jurisdictional base, [ ] the statutory claims were allowed to go forward, and were decided on the merits, under the court’s pendent
jurisdiction.”80
The Supreme Court’s § 1983 doctrine reached a tipping point
in 1980, when the Court held that § 1983 “broadly encompasses
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.”81 In
Maine v Thiboutot,82 the Court authorized two parents, who had
eight children, to pursue a § 1983 action to sue the Maine
Department of Human Services for withholding AFDC benefits to
which they were entitled.83 The Court drew support from a line of
§ 1983 cases involving claims that alleged violations of both constitutional rights and statutory rights created by the SSA.84 The
Court noted that “§ 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory
cause of action because . . . the SSA affords no private right of
action” on its own.85 The Court refused to limit the scope of § 1983

the late 1970s, the Supreme Court “sharply restricted the availability of private rights of
action, effectively abandoning the approach of Borak and Cort”).
77 See Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 413–15 (cited in note 21). See also Richard B.
Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv L Rev 1193,
1207 (1982) (explaining that implied “private rights of action may usurp [an] agency’s responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature
and amount of enforcement activity, and force courts to determine in the first instance the
meaning of a regulatory statute”); Bauman, 30 Stan L Rev at 1243 (cited in note 71) (“On
the one hand, an implied cause of action may further legislative goals by relieving the
burden placed on overworked or indifferent administrators. On the other hand, an improperly implied cause of action may frustrate the legislature’s purpose by circumventing bureaucratic expertise or prosecutorial discretion.”).
78 See Note, Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev
1133, 1172 (1977).
79 See, for example, Quern v Mandley, 436 US 725, 729 & n 3 (1978); Hagans v
Lavine, 415 US 528, 531–33 (1974); Carter v Stanton, 405 US 669, 670 (1972); Miller v
Youakim, 440 US 125, 133–34 (1979).
80 Thiboutot, 448 US at 5–6.
81 Id at 4.
82 448 US 1 (1980).
83 Id at 3–4.
84 Id at 6 (collecting cases). See also text accompanying note 79.
85 Thiboutot, 448 US at 6.
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protections “to some subset of laws” and found that § 1983 expressly provides a private cause of action for plaintiffs to enforce
rights created by any federal law,86 including Spending Clause
legislation such as the SSA and its subsequent amendments.87
C.

Section 1983 Enforcement following Thiboutot

Thiboutot did not articulate a precise standard for determining whether a statute creates a right that is privately enforceable
under § 1983, and it was only through subsequent Supreme Court
decisions that a test began to emerge. In Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v Halderman,88 one year after Thiboutot, the Court
provided some guidance while slightly narrowing the scope of
§ 1983 actions. The Court held that Spending Clause legislation
“is much in the nature of a contract,” and hence there can “be no
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”89 According to the
Court, if there is no “language suggesting that [a statutory provision represents] a ‘condition’ for the receipt of federal funding,”
then the provision does not create a right that is enforceable under § 1983.90 Thus, the Pennhurst Court qualified Thiboutot by
stressing that a provision of Spending Clause legislation may be
enforced via § 1983 only if the provision is tied to federal funding.
But with the exception of Pennhurst, the Court took a liberal approach toward § 1983 actions during the 1980s.
Part I.C.1 analyzes the Court’s initial approach to § 1983 enforcement, which was relatively favorable to plaintiffs alleging violations of a statutory right. By the 1990s, the Supreme Court
began chipping away at the availability of § 1983 actions.91
Part I.C.2 examines this shift, which began with the one case in
which the Supreme Court has analyzed § 1983 enforceability of a
provision of the CWA. Part I.C.3 discusses the Court’s more recent and narrow approach to finding an enforceable statutory
right, focusing especially on the Court’s attempts to clarify the

86

Id at 4.
See id at 22 (Powell dissenting) (“In practical effect, today’s decision means that
state and local governments, officers, and employees now may face liability whenever a
person believes he has been injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative
program.”) (citations omitted).
88 451 US 1 (1981).
89 Id at 17.
90 Id at 13.
91 See Samberg-Champion, 103 Colum L Rev at 1841 (cited in note 16).
87
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confusion caused by past § 1983 cases.92 However, this confusion
persists today, and it strikes at the core of the circuit split that
this Comment seeks to resolve.
1. The Supreme Court took a liberal approach toward
§ 1983 enforcement in the 1980s.
Pennhurst was followed by a brief detour of expansive § 1983
enforcement that lasted until the early 1990s.93 In two cases during this period, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of
statutory provisions under § 1983.94 Both of these decisions represented an initially “liberal standard” under which the Court
generally viewed federal statutes that benefitted the plaintiff as
enforceable under § 1983.95 So long as a provision of Spending
Clause legislation was “phrased in terms benefiting” the plaintiff
and used mandatory and specific language, the Court appeared
willing to uphold the enforceability of a provision under § 1983.96
These two cases have not been overruled, and lower courts have
relied extensively on both to find rights within other statutes that
are enforceable under § 1983.97
First, in Wright v City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority,98 the Court held that tenants in a low income housing
project could bring a § 1983 action against their city’s public housing authority for overcharging them for rent in violation of the
Brook Amendment of the Housing Act of 1937,99 a piece of Spending
Clause legislation.100 The Brook Amendment required that “[a]
family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this
chapter” an amount not to exceed a prescribed portion of the family’s income.101 The provision was located within a section titled
“Rental payments”102 and a subsection titled “Families included;
92

See note 145 and accompanying text.
See Nicole Huberfield, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983
Enforcement, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 UC Davis L Rev 413, 430 (2008).
94 See generally Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association, 496 US 498 (1990); Wright v
City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 US 418 (1987).
95 Bradford C. Mank, Suing under 1983: The Future after Gonzaga University v. Doe,
39 Houston L Rev 1417, 1445 (2003).
96 Wilder, 496 US at 510.
97 See notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
98 479 US 418 (1987).
99 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-152, § 213(a), 83 Stat
379, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1437a(a).
100 Wright, 479 US at 430.
101 Id at 420 n 2, citing 42 USC § 1437a(a).
102 42 USC § 1437a.
93
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amount.”103 According to the Court, the language of the provision
indicated that the limits on rental payments were “mandatory” and
that Congress’s “intent to benefit tenants [was] undeniable.”104
Moreover, the Court noted that the legislative history indicated
that private actions were to be “anticipated.”105
Second, in Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association,106 the
Supreme Court held that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid
Act107 provided medical providers with an enforceable right under
§ 1983 to medical service reimbursements that were “reasonable
and adequate.”108 Like the Brook Amendment at issue in Wright,
the Boren Amendment was also a piece of Spending Clause legislation. It mandated that for states to receive federal funds, they
needed to submit and have approved medical assistance plans
that “provide[d] . . . for payment . . . of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility
. . . through the use of rates . . . which the State [found] . . . [were]
reasonable and adequate.”109 The Court found that the language
of the statute left “little doubt that health care providers [were]
the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment” because they
were the recipients of the payments.110 Moreover, because the
statutory provision prescribed an action states “must” take, it imposed a “binding obligation” on states.111 Thus, the Court found
that § 1983 actions were available to medical care providers to
enforce their right to adequate payments for the medical services
they provided.
In both Wright and Wilder, the Court observed that there are
only two “exceptions to [the] rule” that § 1983 provides private individuals with a cause of action for violations of a federal law.112
First, § 1983 actions are unavailable to enforce statutes that foreclose enforcement, either explicitly or implicitly.113 While statutory

103

42 USC § 1437a(a).
Wright, 479 US at 430.
105 Id at 425.
106 496 US 498 (1990).
107 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-203, § 4112, 101
Stat 1330, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A).
108 Wilder, 496 US at 510.
109 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
110 Wilder, 496 US at 510.
111 Id at 512.
112 Id at 508; Wright, 479 US at 423.
113 See Wilder, 496 US at 520–21, citing Middlesex County Sewage Authority v
National Sea Clammers Association, 453 US 1, 20 (1981). See also Wright, 479 US at 423.
104
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text that explicitly forecloses private enforcement is fairly straightforward, implicit foreclosure is less so. The Court has explained
that, when a statutory provision includes an elaborate administrative scheme or an enforcement mechanism for federal review of individual claims, courts may infer that Congress intended for private enforcement under § 1983 to be incompatible with
administrative enforcement and thus unavailable.114 The second
and more fundamental exception to § 1983 enforcement of a federal
law is if “the statute [does] not create enforceable rights.”115 According to the Court, “Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.’”116
In Wright and Wilder, the Court found that the statutory provisions at issue conferred statutory rights because they were
phrased in terms benefitting the plaintiffs and employed mandatory and specific language. The Court further found that the existing enforcement mechanisms in the statutes were not so comprehensive as to imply a congressional intent to foreclose
enforcement under § 1983, with the Wilder court adding that the
“availability of state administrative procedures ordinarily does
not foreclose resort to § 1983.”117 Soon after, however, the Court
began to shift away from the relatively liberal approach regarding
enforcement epitomized by Wright and Wilder.
2. The Supreme Court began to limit the scope of § 1983
following Wright and Wilder in the 1990s, and Congress
responded.
In 1992, the Court took a sharp turn away from the liberal
approach toward § 1983 enforcement in Wright and Wilder. The
Court analyzed the “reasonable efforts” provision of the CWA in
Suter v Artist M118 and held that it was unenforceable under
§ 1983 because it was too vague.119 Invoking the family preservation paradigm,120 this provision imposed on states an obligation to
114 See Wilder, 496 US at 520–21; Wright, 479 US at 423. See also Sea Clammers, 453
US at 20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
of suits under § 1983.”).
115 Wilder, 496 US at 508, quoting Wright, 479 US at 423.
116 Wilder, 496 US at 509, quoting Golden State Transit Corp v Los Angeles, 493 US
103, 106 (1989).
117 Wilder, 496 US at 523 (emphasis added).
118 503 US 347 (1992).
119 Id at 364.
120 See text accompanying notes 51–54.
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make “reasonable efforts” to “prevent or eliminate the need for
removal” of a child from his or her home before doing so as one of
the conditions for receiving federal funding under the CWA.121
The Court observed that the CWA provides no specific guidance
for how courts or state agencies are to measure “reasonable efforts” in order to ensure compliance with the statutory provision.122 Consequently, the Court found that Congress did not intend the vague provision to be privately enforceable.123
The Suter Court’s conclusion that the CWA’s “reasonable
efforts” provision was unenforceable due to a lack of specific
statutory language was in line with Pennhurst,124 Wilder,125 and
Wright,126 but other parts of the decision were not. Specifically,
Suter departed from earlier cases because it also questioned the
enforceability of any statutory provision of Spending Clause
legislation that is a requirement that state plans must satisfy for
approval. According to the Court, the CWA did “not provide notice
to the States that failure to do anything other than submit a plan
with the requisite features” was required to receive federal
funding.127 In short, the Court held that the CWA only requires
states to submit plans that satisfy the listed conditions—and
nothing more—in order to receive federal funding.128 After the
state plan is approved, states do not have to abide by the CWA’s
conditions because the statute does not condition federal funding
on anything “other than” submitting the plan.129 Because of
Pennhurst’s requirement that only statutory provisions that are
conditions for federal funding are enforceable under § 1983,130 the
Court found that the CWA’s provisions that require state action
beyond submitting a state plan are not tied to funding and thus
unenforceable.131

121

42 USC § 671(a)(15).
Suter, 503 US at 360.
123 Id at 364.
124 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 19.
125 See Wright, 479 US at 432.
126 See Wilder, 496 US at 511–12.
127 Suter, 503 US at 362 (emphasis added).
128 See id at 358 (“[T]he Act does place a requirement on the States, but that requirement only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary.”).
129 See id at 362.
130 See note 90 and accompanying text.
131 See Suter, 503 US at 359–60.
122
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Congress responded swiftly to the Suter decision by amending the SSA.132 The amended provision, commonly called the
“Suter fix,”133 applied to all provisions of the SSA, and it provides:
“[A] provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its
inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or
specifying the required contents of a State plan.”134 Although the
Suter fix did not overturn the holding in Suter that the “reasonable efforts” provision of the CWA is unenforceable under § 1983,135
it did purport to overturn all of the Suter Court’s reasoning that
was not present in prior Supreme Court decisions.136 The practical
effect of the Suter fix is that the “reasonable efforts” provision remained unenforceable under § 1983 due to its lack of guidance
and specificity. However, the basic fact that Spending Clause legislation, such as the CWA, requires states to submit plans that
satisfy a list of conditions before receiving federal funding does
not foreclose private enforcement of the required conditions after
states receive approval and implement their plans.
3. The Supreme Court’s current approach to § 1983 actions.
The current test that guides the judicial inquiry into whether
a statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 is known as
the “Blessing test,” and it incorporates several of the factors analyzed in Pennhurst, Wright, Wilder, and Suter.137 In Blessing v
Freestone,138 the Supreme Court crystallized three factors that
must be satisfied to find an enforceable right: (1) “Congress must
have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”;139 (2) “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that
its enforcement would strain judicial competence”;140 and (3) “the
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
132 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of Federal Law: Why the District
Court Was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 Health Matrix 139, 153 (2002).
133 See Dorris, 23 Children’s Legal Rts J at 30 (cited in note 24).
134 42 USC § 1320a-2.
135 See 42 USC § 1320a-2 (stating that “this section is not intended to alter the holding
in [Suter] that section 671(a)(15) of this title is not enforceable in a private right of action”).
136 See 42 USC § 1320a-2 (stating that the section’s intention is to “overturn[ ]” any
grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce requirements of state
plans that were “applied in [Suter], but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability”).
137 See, for example, Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1196; Wagner, 624 F3d at 979.
138 520 US 329 (1997).
139 Id at 340.
140 Id at 340–41.
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States. In other words, . . . the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory rather than precatory terms.”141 The Court in Blessing
cautioned, however, that a plaintiff who satisfies these three factors has only staked out a “rebuttable presumption” that a statutory right is enforceable under § 1983. A defendant may rebut this
presumption by showing that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy for violations of the asserted statutory right, either explicitly
or implicitly.142
For courts applying the Blessing test, the first factor—
whether Congress intended the statute in question to benefit the
plaintiff—has proved the most contentious. Five years after
Blessing, in Gonzaga University v Doe,143 Chief Justice William
Rehnquist opined that the Court’s “opinions in this area may not
be models of clarity.”144 Therefore, the Court sought to clear up
“confusion” among “some courts” resulting from the language of
the first Blessing factor.145 According to the Court, the judicial
inquiry into whether a federal statutory provision creates an
enforceable right under § 1983 “is no different from the initial
inquiry in an implied right of action case, the express purpose of
which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confer[s] rights on
a particular class of persons.’” 146 Thus, the Court imported part of
the judicial inquiry underlying earlier implied causes of action
doctrine “as to whether or not Congress intended to confer
individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”147
The Gonzaga Court held that a former university student
could not bring a § 1983 action against his university for allegedly
releasing personal information without consent in violation of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act148 (FERPA), a piece of
Spending Clause legislation.149 The Court did not apply the entire
Blessing test because it found that the FERPA provision failed

141

Id at 341.
See Blessing, 520 US at 341, citing Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107, 113 (1994).
143 536 US 273 (2002).
144 Id at 278.
145 Id at 283.
146 Id at 285, quoting California v Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 294 (1981).
147 Gonzaga, 536 US at 285. See also note 75 and accompanying text. Under the implied right of action doctrine, “[i]n determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one,” courts first consider whether the plaintiff is a member “of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.” Cort, 422 US at 78,
quoting Texas & Pacific Railway, 241 US at 39 (emphasis in original).
148 Pub L No 93-380, 88 Stat 571 (2000), codified as amended at 20 USC § 1232g.
149 Gonzaga, 536 US at 278.
142
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the first factor—whether Congress intended the statute in question to benefit the plaintiff.150 The remaining two factors of the
Blessing test—whether the asserted right is too “vague and amorphous” for courts to enforce and whether the right is couched in
“mandatory” terms151—are presumably unaffected by Gonzaga.
In its efforts to harmonize its analysis in earlier § 1983 cases
with that in implied cause of action cases, the Court in Gonzaga
added additional layers to Blessing’s requirement that a statutory
provision benefit the plaintiff. The Gonzaga Court drew on several factors that plaintiffs were required to satisfy in earlier implied cause of action cases and incorporated these factors into the
fold of its § 1983 analysis.152 These factors included: (1) whether
the statute employs “‘rights-creating language’ critical to showing
the requisite congressional intent to create new rights;”153
(2) whether the statute conveys an “aggregate” focus on federal
funding and regulating statewide polices or an “individual” focus
on the needs and interests of individuals;154 and (3) whether the
statute supplies a “federal review mechanism” through which aggrieved individuals can submit claims.155
The Court applied these factors to the FERPA provision and
found that it failed all three. The FERPA provision states that
“[n]o funds shall be made available . . . to any educational agency
or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of students without the written consent of their parents.”156 First, the Court held that the FERPA
provision does not contain “rights-creating” language because it
ties a loss of funding not to individual instances of unauthorized
disclosures of a student’s educational records but rather to the
use of certain prohibited policies or practices.157 Second, by focusing on the system-wide policies of state educational institutions,
the FERPA provision contained an “aggregate” focus that was
“two steps removed from the interests of individual students.”158
Lastly, FERPA provided a federal review mechanism in which it

150

Id at 282–84.
See Blessing, 520 US at 340–41.
152 See, for example, Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 288–89 (2001); California v
Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 294 (1981).
153 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287, citing Alexander, 532 US at 288–89.
154 Gonzaga, 536 US at 288, citing Blessing, 520 US at 343.
155 Gonzaga, 536 US at 289–90.
156 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1).
157 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287.
158 Id at 287–88.
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“required the Secretary to ‘establish or designate [a] review board’
for investigating and adjudicating [alleged] violations.”159 Finding
that the FERPA provision did not satisfy the first factor of the
Blessing test, the Court ended its analysis.160
Courts have struggled to incorporate Gonzaga into the
Blessing framework in a consistent manner. Although the
Gonzaga Court aimed to clear up confusion among lower courts
about how to determine if a statutory provision confers an
enforceable right under § 1983,161 the decision further entrenched
disagreement in lower federal courts.162 Because Gonzaga did not
explicitly overrule precedents and instead relied heavily on
Pennhurst, Wright, Wilder, and Blessing, many lower courts have
continued to do the same.163 However, whereas the Court’s
precedents routinely analyzed whether statutory provisions
benefitted the plaintiff, Gonzaga stressed that “it is rights, not the
broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced”
under § 1983.164 Where to draw the line between rights on the one
hand and benefits or interests on the other is far from settled.
II. FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS: A PRIVATELY
ENFORCEABLE RIGHT?
In recent years, many foster parents and foster care providers
have filed actions under § 1983 alleging state violations of their
statutory right to foster care maintenance payments granted by
the CWA. Courts have analyzed the relevant provisions of the
CWA according to the Blessing test and in light of Gonzaga. Currently, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that the CWA confers a
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Id at 289, quoting 42 USC § 1232g(g).
Gonzaga, 536 US at 290.
161 Id at 283.
162 See Samberg-Champion, Note, 103 Colum L Rev at 1839 (cited in note 16) (“Despite Gonzaga’s assertions that it will ‘resolve any ambiguity’ about the Court’s Section
1983 jurisprudence, it is as confusing an opinion as the Supreme Court has issued in this
traditionally fuzzy area.”) (citations omitted).
163 See note 216.
164 Gonzaga, 536 US at 283.
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privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments
under § 1983,165 whereas the Eighth Circuit holds the opposite.166
At the core of the circuit split is how courts, in light of
Gonzaga, should interpret and apply the first factor of the
Blessing test—whether Congress intended the statutory
provision in question to benefit the plaintiff. For this inquiry, the
Gonzaga court identified the existence of “rights-creating
language” and an individual focus, rather than an aggregate
focus, as two of the three elements for inferring congressional
intent to confer an individual right.167 The third element is
whether the statute has a federal review mechanism for
individual claims,168 which all of the circuits agree the CWA
lacks.169 But only the Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that the foster
care maintenance payment provisions contain rights-creating
language and an individual focus. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits
applied the remaining Blessing factors, and both courts found
that the statutory language satisfies all three factors. In contrast,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the foster care maintenance
payment provisions fail the first factor of the Blessing test and
therefore found that it “need not analyze the remaining Blessing
factors.”170 Parts II.A and II.B summarize each side of this
unresolved circuit split.
A.

The Sixth and Ninth Circuits: The CWA Focuses on
Protecting Individual Rights

In California State Foster Parent Association v Wagner,171 the
Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to uphold
the enforceability of the CWA’s requirement that states make
foster care maintenance payments on behalf of eligible children
165 See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 380 (6th Cir 2017); California State Foster Parent
Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010). Several district courts have also
found that the CWA confers a privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments under § 1983. See, for example, C.H. v Payne, 683 F Supp 2d 865, 878 (SD Ind 2010).
166 See Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1202
(8th Cir 2013). Several district courts have held the same. See, for example, New York
State Citizens’ Coalition for Children v Carrion, 31 F Supp 3d 512, 527 (EDNY 2014).
167 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287–88.
168 Id at 289.
169 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202; Glisson, 847 F3d at 380; Wagner, 624
F3d at 982.
170 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202. The Gonzaga Court similarly found that
the FERPA provision failed the first factor of the Blessing test and did not apply the remaining factors. See Gonzaga, 536 US at 287–90.
171 624 F3d 974 (9th Cir 2010).
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under § 1983.172 There, a nonprofit organization representing
foster parents in California alleged that the foster care
maintenance payments that foster parents received from the
State of California failed to cover the costs required by the
CWA.173 Similarly, in D.O. v Glisson,174 the Sixth Circuit
authorized a foster parent to sue the State of Kentucky for
making inadequate foster care maintenance payments.175
Both circuits spent the majority of their analysis on applying
the first factor of the Blessing test to the CWA. Comparing the
CWA to the FERPA provision in Gonzaga, the Ninth Circuit
found that the CWA is “unlike FERPA” because it has an individual focus, rather than an aggregate focus, and because payments
can be made only to an “individual” foster parent or institution
providing care for a qualifying foster child.176 The Ninth Circuit
found that the language “on behalf of each child” found in
§ 672(a)(1)—the provision that requires states to make foster care
maintenance payments to eligible foster caregivers—rose to the
level of rights-creating language under this factor because it “focuses squarely on the individuals protected rather than the entities regulated.”177
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress intended the CWA
to confer upon the plaintiffs a right to foster care maintenance
payments because statutory language, such as that in § 672(a),
“phrased in the active voice, with the state as the subject, confer[s] individually enforceable rights.”178 The State of Kentucky
argued that, when statutory language employs the active voice
with the state as the subject, the statute indicates an aggregate
focus on states regulated, rather than on individual rights.179 The
court disagreed, finding that making the state the subject of the
statutory provision was necessary to make clear to states that
they are required to make foster care maintenance payments with
respect to each individual foster child who qualifies.180
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See id at 982.
Id at 976–77.
174 847 F3d 374 (6th Cir 2017).
175 Id at 376.
176 Wagner, 624 F3d at 980–81.
177 Id at 980.
178 Glisson, 847 F3d at 379.
179 Id.
180 See id (“When Congress names the state as the subject, writes in the active voice,
and uses mandatory language, it leaves no doubt about the actor’s identity or what the
law requires.”).
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After finding the first Blessing factor was satisfied, the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits applied the second and third factors of the
Blessing test, finding that both factors were easily met. Analyzing
the second factor, both circuits found that the right conferred
upon the plaintiffs was not “vague and amorphous” to the extent
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.181 The circuits analyzed § 672(a)(1) in conjunction with § 675(4)(A), the provision that defines foster care maintenance payments, and concluded that the itemized list of costs therein establishes clearly
the content of the asserted right.182
As for the third factor of the Blessing test, both circuits found
that the phrase “shall make” in § 672(a)(1) unambiguously commands that the payment of foster care maintenance payments is
mandatory.183 The courts found that, by dictating what a state
“shall” do “on behalf of each child,”184 the statutory provision could
not be more mandatory.185 As the Sixth Circuit bluntly concluded:
“It isn’t optional.”186 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the
State does not seriously contend that the § 672(a)’s language is
precatory rather than mandatory,” suggesting that the use of
“shall” could not be reasonably interpreted as imposing anything
less than a binding obligation.187
Ultimately, both circuits quickly concluded that the state in
each case failed to rebut the presumptive enforceability of the
right to foster care maintenance payments.188 Although the CWA
requires that states grant “an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency” for the aggrieved,189 the Act lacks a federal
review mechanism for addressing claims raised by foster caregivers.190 According to the Ninth Circuit, the lack of a federal administrative forum for reviewing individual claims “lends additional
support” to the conclusion that Congress intended to create an
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See id at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 981.
See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 980. See also Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1979, S Rep No 96-336, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 15 (1979), reprinted
in 1980 USCCAN 1448, 1464 (explaining that Congress provided the specific definition as
a response to “general confusion about what can be called a foster care maintenance
payment”).
183 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982.
184 42 USC § 672(a)(1) (emphasis added).
185 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982.
186 Glisson, 847 F3d at 379.
187 Wagner, 624 F3d at 982.
188 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 380; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982.
189 42 USC § 671(a)(12).
190 Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81, quoting Wilder, 496 US at 523.
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enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.191 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit found that the CWA lacks a federal review
mechanism and that the available state administrative procedures do not foreclose access to § 1983 remedies.192
B.

The Eighth Circuit: The CWA Focuses on Regulating States

Unlike the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the foster care maintenance payment provision as primarily addressing state compliance, and therefore it found the focus of the statutory provision to be on regulating states in the
aggregate rather than on protecting individual rights. Applying
the same test to the same statutory provisions as the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit held in Midwest Foster Care and
Adoption Association v Kincade193 that the CWA does not create
an enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments under
§ 1983.194 The Eighth Circuit compared the CWA’s language to the
FERPA provision at issue in Gonzaga, and it determined that the
foster care maintenance payment provisions similarly failed the
first factor of the Blessing test because of its focus on regulating
states in the aggregate.195
First, the court found that the CWA’s statutory language falls
short of constituting “rights-creating” language. According to the
court, the foster care maintenance payment provisions address
the states as participants with the federal government within the
federal-state cooperative design of the CWA.196 Second, the Eighth
Circuit found that the CWA’s provisions maintain an aggregate
focus on overall compliance rather than an emphasis on the rights
of individuals. The court cited the federal compliance scheme located in another section of the SSA, which states that the
“Secretary [of Health and Human Services] ‘must promulgate regulations for the review of [state] programs to determine whether
191 Wagner, 624 F3d at 982, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 289–90 (“The fact that [foster
caregivers] have no administrative forum in which to raise their concerns lends additional
support to [the] conclusion that Congress intended to create an enforceable right here, just
as the presence of an administrative mechanism ‘buttressed’ the Supreme Court’s opposite
conclusion in Gonzaga.”).
192 Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81.
193 712 F3d 1190 (8th Cir 2013).
194 Id at 1202.
195 Id at 1197.
196 See id at 1200, quoting Gonzaga, 536 US at 284 (“The unmistakable focus of
§ 672(a) and § 675(4)(A) on the states as regulated participants in [a] federal cost-sharing
program precludes us from finding that these provisions are ‘phrased in terms of the [foster caregivers].’”).
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[such programs are in] substantial conformity’” with the requirements that various titles of the SSA, including the CWA, place on
state programs.197 According to the Eighth Circuit, this emphasis
on “substantial” rather than “perfect” compliance “cuts against an
individually enforceable right because, even where a state substantially complies with its federal responsibilities, a sizeable minority of its beneficiaries may nonetheless fail to receive the full
panoply of offered benefits.”198
However, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the Brook
Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which was at issue in Wilder,
was also subject to the SSA’s substantial compliance regime, and
yet the Wilder Court still found the statutory provision to be enforceable.199 Thus, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “a substantial
compliance regime may suggest an absence of the requisite congressional intent, [but] it cannot by itself establish an aggregate
focus.”200 Nevertheless, the court inferred that the CWA contains
an aggregate focus because of its conclusion that each reference
to foster care maintenance payments is enmeshed within a
broader statutory framework focused on state compliance and
federal funding.201 Lastly, the Eighth Circuit conceded that there
is no federal mechanism for reviewing the claims of foster caregivers.202 Nevertheless, the court decided that this absence is outweighed by the lack of “rights-creating” language and the CWA’s
“aggregate focus.”203
In sum, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits over what the Gonzaga Court meant by “aggregate
focus” and “rights-creating” language. According to the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, § 672(a) employs obligatory language to address
states, and it is specific about what each foster caregiver is entitled to receive from her state for caring for an eligible child. Thus,
these circuits viewed § 672(a) as having a focus on individual foster caregivers with the purpose of creating a right to foster care
maintenance payments. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit

197

See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1194, citing 42 USC § 1320a-2a (emphasis

added).
198

Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1200–01.
Id at 1201.
200 Id, citing Sabree v Richman, 367 F3d 180, 192 (3d Cir 2004).
201 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1201 (noting that, “[w]here the Supreme
Court has found individually enforceable rights, they have not been ensconced by references to actions that trigger such a funding prohibition”).
202 Id at 1202.
203 Id at 1201–02.
199
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viewed foster caregivers and eligible foster children as less central to § 672(a). Consequently, it found that the statutory provision serves a regulatory function in which the primary focus is on
overall state compliance for the purpose of receiving federal
funds.
III. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO FOSTER CARE
MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS
All of the circuit courts involved in the split drew on the statutory provisions at issue in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga to either
support or distinguish the CWA, but there are several similarities
and differences between the statutory provisions that the courts
have overlooked. Moreover, all of the circuit courts focused almost
exclusively on § 672(a) and § 675(4)(A), paying less attention to
the other provisions within the CWA’s structure that shed some
light on how to interpret the foster care maintenance payment
provisions. In the circuit courts’ attempt to infer congressional intent to create (or not create) an enforceable right, the courts limited their opinions mostly to the text, ignoring important answers
available in the legislative history.
This Part argues that Congress intended to confer upon foster caregivers a privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments by drawing support from aspects of the CWA’s
text, structure, and legislative history and purpose that the circuit courts have ignored. Part III.A analyzes the text and structure of the CWA’s provisions and, in particular, examines how the
language of § 672 is more focused on the individual rights of foster
caregivers compared to other sections of the CWA. Part III.B locates the CWA within the broader context of its enactment and
analyzes how private enforcement of foster care maintenance
payments comports with the CWA’s legislative purpose. In addition, Part III.B highlights some of the CWA’s legislative history
implying that Congress intended provisions of the CWA to be privately enforceable under § 1983.
A.

Rereading the CWA for Rights-Creating Language and an
Individual Focus under Gonzaga

The overarching inquiry in § 1983 actions is whether the “text
and structure” of the statute indicate that Congress intended to
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create an enforceable individual right.204 A statutory provision is
enforceable under § 1983 if it contains “rights-creating language”
and conveys an “individual focus.”205 This Section draws on aspects of the Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga provisions pertaining to
“rights-creating language” and an “individual focus.” Whereas the
Gonzaga court found the FERPA provision easily distinguishable
from the Wright and Wilder provisions, this Section argues that
the foster care maintenance payment provisions, § 672(a) and
§ 675(4)(A), are much more similar to the Wright and Wilder provisions than to the FERPA provision in Gonzaga.206 While the
FERPA provision explicitly references federal funding in the context of states’ policies to ensure student privacy, the foster care
maintenance provisions lack any reference to federal funding and
refer only to the exchange of monetary assistance between states
and individual foster caregivers.
To this day, Wright and Wilder remain the only cases since
Thiboutot in which the Court found examples of Spending Clause
legislation creating enforceable rights under § 1983.207 Gonzaga
relied on both Wright and Wilder, implying that the Supreme
Court would still find the provisions at issue in each case enforceable today. As the Gonzaga Court noted, Wright and Wilder both
involved statutes that “explicitly conferred specific monetary entitlements upon the plaintiffs.”208 Addressing Wilder specifically,
the Court explained that there was “no doubt” that Congress intended for the provision in Wilder to be privately enforceable under § 1983 because it required states to pay a “monetary entitlement” to certain individuals.209 Gonzaga’s nod of approval toward
the holdings of Wright and Wilder suggests that the Court may
be more willing to uphold the enforceability of a specific monetary
entitlement under § 1983. As Part III.B.2 further contends, suing
for damages to recover an unpaid monetary entitlement imposes
204

See Gonzaga, 536 US at 286.
See id at 290–91.
206 This Part does not focus on the second and third factors of the Blessing test because
there is no circuit split over how these factors should be applied to foster care maintenance
payments.
207 Gonzaga, 536 US at 280. Pennhurst, Suter, Blessing, and Gonzaga each involved
provisions of Spending Clause legislation that the Court found unenforceable under
§ 1983.
208 Gonzaga, 536 US at 280.
209 Id at 280–81, citing Wilder, 496 US at 522–23 (“Congress left no doubt of its intent
for private enforcement, we said, because the provision required States to pay an ‘objective’
monetary entitlement to individual health care providers, with no sufficient administrative means of enforcing the requirement against States that failed to comply.”).
205
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less of a burden on state autonomy than does suing for equitable
relief to enjoin a state practice or policy.210
However, as the Supreme Court later explained in Armstrong
v Exceptional Child Center, Inc,211 Gonzaga rejected the inference
that Wilder permits § 1983 actions to enforce “anything short of
an unambiguously conferred right.”212 Armstrong involved
implied rights of action rather than § 1983 actions, holding that
Medicaid does not confer implied rights of action.213 Nevertheless,
circuit courts have recently emphasized that “Armstrong isn’t a
§ 1983 case,” and thus Armstrong’s implied right of action holding
is not binding on analysis in the § 1983 context.214 Although
finding an implied right of action within a statute requires that
the plaintiff show that Congress intended to create a right and a
remedy for violation of that right, § 1983 cases require only that
the plaintiff show that Congress intended to create an enforceable
right because § 1983 supplies the remedy.215 In the Tenth Circuit’s
assessment of Armstrong, “[B]ecause Justice [Anthony] Kennedy
didn’t join Justice [Antonin] Scalia’s Spending Clause reasoning,
it is not binding” in the § 1983 context—on the other hand,
“Wilder still is.”216
Acknowledging the additional hurdles imposed by Gonzaga,
many circuit courts have continued to draw heavily on Wright and
Wilder to find private rights of action under § 1983 to enforce a
variety of Spending Clause statutory provisions.217 For example,
210 In Pennhurst, Suter, and Blessing, the plaintiffs sued for equitable relief,
whereas in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga, the plaintiffs sued for damages. Only in
Wright and Wilder did the provision in question confer upon the plaintiffs a monetary
entitlement that the state was required to provide and protect.
211 135 S Ct 1378 (2015).
212 Id at 1386 n *, quoting Gonzaga, 536 US at 283.
213 Armstrong, 135 S Ct at 1385 (stating that the “sole remedy Congress provided for
a State’s failure to comply with Medicaid’s requirements . . . is the withholding of Medicaid
funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services”).
214 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Kansas v Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1229
(10th Cir 2018).
215 See note 293 and accompanying text.
216 Planned Parenthood of Kansas, 882 F3d at 1229. See also BT Bourbonnais Care,
LLC v Norwood, 866 F3d 815, 820–21 (7th Cir 2017) (“[N]othing in Armstrong, Gonzaga,
or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden
in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause
powers. . . . [H]ad that been the Court’s intent, . . . [a] simple ‘no’ would have sufficed.”).
217 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Kansas, 882 F3d at 1229 (“Wilder still is
[binding].”); BT Bourbonnais Care, 866 F3d at 820 (noting that “the Supreme Court has
never overruled its decision in Wilder”); Briggs v Bremby, 792 F3d 239, 244 (2d Cir 2015)
(noting that Gonzaga does not “undercut the applicability of Wright and Wilder to the case
before us” because “[n]one of the three factors that the Supreme Court used to distinguish
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the Third Circuit has noted that the Gonzaga Court “carefully
avoided disturbing, much less overruling, Wright and Wilder,”
stressing that “the Court relied on those cases in crafting
Gonzaga.”218 In addition, the Second Circuit has drawn on several
factors that the Court highlighted in Gonzaga to distinguish the
FERPA provision from the provisions in Wright and Wilder,
including a focus on entities “being regulated rather than on the
interests of” individuals, as well as a focus on regulating a
“general ‘policy or practice’ . . . rather than focusing on specific
instances of” state action.219 The Second Circuit concluded that,
as long as these distinguishing factors are absent in a given
statute, Gonzaga does not “undercut the applicability of Wright
and Wilder.”220
Despite the changes in the Court’s § 1983 doctrine since
Wright and Wilder, the statutes in both cases still provide helpful
examples of the type of statutory language that would pass the
Blessing test after Gonzaga. This Section posits that the text and
structure of the CWA’s foster care maintenance payment provisions are more similar to the text and structure of the Wright and
Wilder provisions than the FERPA provision in Gonzaga. The foster care maintenance payment provisions convey an “individual
focus” and employ “rights-creating language.” But these two aspects frequently overlap, for provisions that contain “rightscreating language” also tend to convey an “individual focus”—and
vice versa. According to Gonzaga, to contain rights-creating language, a statutory provision must include “individually focused
terminology” such that the statute’s focus is not “removed from
the interests of [the] individual[s]” claiming an enforceable

the statute in Gonzaga from those in Wright and Wilder apply to the provisions here”);
Romano v Greenstein, 721 F3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir 2013) (relying extensively on Wilder
and Gonzaga and holding that 42 USC § 1396a(a)(8) provides a private right of action
under § 1983 to ensure that Medicaid assistance be provided with “reasonable
promptness” to eligible individuals); Bontrager v Indiana Family and Social Services
Administration, 697 F3d 604, 607 (7th Cir 2012) (“Although we have acknowledged that
Gonzaga may have taken a new analytical approach, . . . Wilder has not been overruled.”)
(quotation marks omitted); Sabree v Richman, 367 F3d 180, 184 (3d Cir 2004) (“Gonzaga
did not overrule Wilder; rather, it explained that ‘Congress left no doubt of its intent for
private enforcement.’ . . . Neither did the Court overrule Wright; rather, it identified it as
an instance in which Congress ‘unambiguously conferred a mandatory [benefit].’”), quoting Gonzaga, 536 US at 280–81. But see Does v Gillespie, 867 F3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir
2017) (concluding that Gonzaga sub silentio overruled Wilder).
218 Sabree, 367 F3d at 184.
219 Briggs, 792 F3d at 244.
220 Id.
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right.221 Similarly, to convey an “individual focus,” a statutory provision must pertain to the protection of individual rights and entitlements, not to policies and practices, which would instead convey an “aggregate focus.”222
1. The structure of the CWA addresses individual foster
caregivers and state compliance separately.
The structure of the CWA divides the requirement that states
make foster care maintenance payments into two interlocking
sections. The first provision addressing foster care maintenance
payments is in § 671, which provides that, “[i]n order for a State
to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan”223
that, among many other things, “provides for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with section 672.”224 Section 672
mandates that each state “shall make foster care maintenance
payments on behalf of each child,” and it provides greater detail
about which foster caregivers are entitled to receive assistance.225
By analyzing § 671 and § 672 side by side, it becomes apparent that each section has a distinct focus. Section 671 has an aggregate focus because it enumerates the practices and policies
that states must incorporate into the plans that they submit to
the federal government for approval and funding. All of the conditions in § 671(a) are referenced in the context of describing what
would trigger a funding prohibition. One could argue that none of
these conditions alone is enforceable because of the tension between Pennhurst and Gonzaga over the relationship between enforceable rights and federal funding in Spending Clause legislation.226 On the one hand, Pennhurst instructed that an enforceable
right must be located in a statutory provision that imposes a mandatory condition on states to receive funding. If a provision of
Spending Clause legislation lacks language suggesting that it is
a “‘condition’ for the receipt of federal funding,” then the provision
221

Gonzaga, 536 US at 287.
Id at 288.
223 42 USC § 671(a).
224 42 USC § 671(a)(1).
225 42 USC § 672(a)(1).
226 See Section 1983 and the Spending Power: Enforcement of Federal “Laws” *9–10
(Congressional Research Service, Sept 12, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/K55M-JS2J
(describing this tension). But see BT Bourbonnais Care, 866 F3d at 820–21 (finding that
“nothing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, or any other case we have found supports the idea that
plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers”).
222
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does not create a right that is enforceable under § 1983.227 On the
other hand, Gonzaga cautioned that, if the right asserted by the
plaintiff is referenced only in the context of describing the type of
state actions required for a state to receive funding, then the asserted right is not enforceable under § 1983 because it is intended
only to direct state compliance.228
Taking these statements from Pennhurst and Gonzaga together, we can conclude that, in order to be enforceable under
§ 1983, an asserted right must: (1) be located in a statutory provision that constitutes a condition on states to receive federal
funding to satisfy Pennhurst229 and (2) be located in a statutory
provision that is not connected to federal funding to satisfy
Gonzaga.230 All of the state plan requirements in § 671(a) satisfy
the first requirement above because all of the provisions are tied
to federal funding, but they do not satisfy the second based on the
text of § 671(a) alone. Indeed, something more is needed for a
plaintiff to enforce any of the provisions in § 671(a).
Some of the conditions that appear in § 671(a), such as the
“reasonable efforts” provision found unenforceable in Suter,231 are
not mentioned anywhere else in the CWA. However, some conditions, such as the foster care maintenance provision in § 671(a)(1),
are addressed in greater detail in other sections of the CWA—
outside of the context of federal funding and state compliance that
permeates § 671. Section 672 speaks directly to foster caregivers
who are entitled to receive payment on behalf of eligible foster
children. Thus, it contains an individualized focus that stands in
contrast to the more general focus on state compliance in § 671.
The focal shift between § 671 and § 672 supports the conclusion
that § 672 provides an enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments under § 1983.
a) Section 671(a) contains an aggregate focus. As a whole,
Spending Clause legislation functions as a contract between the
227

Pennhurst, 451 US at 13.
Gonzaga, 536 US at 288–89 (“In each provision the reference to [the asserted right]
is in the context of describing the type of [state action] that triggers a funding prohibition. . . . [S]uch provisions cannot make out the requisite congressional intent to confer
individual rights enforceable by § 1983.”).
229 See Section 1983 and the Spending Power at *9 (“‘Rights’ not connected to terms
and conditions of a state’s spending program may be viewed as free-floating and merely
precatory, as in Pennhurst.”).
230 See id (“[I]f protecting a ‘right’ is included as a requirement of a state plan that
must be approved by a federal official in order for the state to qualify for funding, . . . then
the Court may . . . rule that additional remedies are inappropriate.”).
231 Suter, 503 US at 364. See also notes 118–36.
228
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federal government and the states, and the text of the statute conveys the conditions states must satisfy to receive federal funding.232 However, this does not necessarily mean that every section
and provision of such legislation is specifically about federal funding of state programs and thus unenforceable. The Supreme
Court has never taken this position, and Congress’s Suter fix implies that Spending Clause legislation can still give rise to enforceable rights under § 1983.
However, the clear statement in § 671(a) tying the conditions
to federal funding is vital because it gives notice to states of what
they must do in order to receive federal funding.233 Recall
Pennhurst’s instruction that the “legitimacy” of Spending Clause
legislation “rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” 234 Section 671(a) establishes
the legitimacy of the CWA by making clear to states what they
are agreeing to in return for federal funds. Section 671(a) establishes the overall framework of the CWA, and without it, none of
the CWA’s provisions could possibly be enforceable. For there can
“be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”235 Such a foundation is indeed necessary for the creation of an enforceable right.
However, it is not sufficient because, when viewed in isolation,
§ 671(a) does not explicitly identify the individuals these policies
are designed to serve. Something more—a provision with an individualized focus on the CWA’s intended beneficiaries—is needed
to confer upon foster caregivers an enforceable right to foster care
maintenance payments.
b) Section 671 versus § 672. The CWA’s structure separates
out the relationship between the federal government and states
from the relationship between states and foster caregivers.
Congress carved out § 672 of the CWA as a separate section from
§ 671 to address foster care maintenance payments more fully.
Section 672 provides that “[e]ach State with a plan approved
under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on
behalf of each child”236 to the child’s foster caregiver, whether that

232
233
234
235
236

See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17.
42 USC § 671(a) (“In order for a State to be eligible for payments. . . .”).
See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17.
Id.
42 USC § 672(a)(1).
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is a “foster family”237 or a “child-care institution.”238 Notably,
§ 672(a) addresses only states and the foster caregivers of foster
children on whose behalf foster care maintenance payments must
be provided to cover certain costs. Whereas § 671 contains an
aggregate focus on the contractual relationship between the
federal government and states, § 672 contains a distinctly
individualized focus on the quasicontractual relationship
between states and foster caregivers. Section 672 provides an
important additional layer to the CWA’s framework in which the
right to foster care maintenance payments is divorced from the
aggregate focus that permeates § 671(a).
In contrast, the structure of the FERPA provision in Gonzaga
collapsed the relationships between the federal government, state
institutions, and students and their parents. The respondent, a
former student at Gonzaga University, claimed that students
were the intended beneficiaries of FERPA and that the statute
created an enforceable right to student privacy.239 The statute provided that “[n]o funds shall be made available . . . to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of education records . . . of students without
the written consent of their parents.”240 The provision addressed
both the relationship between the state actors and the federal
government and the relationship between state actors and students and their parents—all in one sentence. Thus, the provision
conveyed both an aggregate focus on state compliance and federal
funding and an individual focus on student privacy. Ultimately,
the Court found that the FERPA provision’s overall emphasis on
state policies precluded the inference that Congress intended for
the provision to be privately enforceable under § 1983.241 By
blending together the relationships between the federal government, state actors, and individuals, the integrated structure of
the FERPA provision is markedly different from the divided
structure of the CWA, which addresses these relationships separately in § 671(a) and § 672(a).

237

42 USC § 672(b)(1).
42 USC § 672(b)(2). See 42 USC § 672(c) for the CWA’s definitions of “foster family
home” and “child-care institution.”
239 Gonzaga, 536 US at 277.
240 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1).
241 Gonzaga, 536 US at 290.
238
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c) The design of § 672 speaks directly to the rights of foster
caregivers. The title of § 672(a)(1), “Eligibility,” refers to individual foster children eligible to have foster care maintenance payments provided on their behalf to their caregivers. Only the
Eighth Circuit noted the section’s title, and the court interprets
the section as “set[ting] forth limitations on when a foster care
maintenance payment is eligible for partial federal reimbursement.”242 However, the Eighth Circuit ignored the CWA’s divided
structure by conflating the use and application of “[e]ligibility” in
§ 672(a)(1) with that of “eligible” in § 671(a). Whereas § 671(a)
addresses the conditions and limitations placed upon states to be
“eligible” for federal reimbursements,243 § 672(a)(1) speaks directly to the individual foster children who are eligible to have
foster care maintenance payments made on their behalf.
In § 672(a)(1), eligibility is linked to whether a foster child
would have been eligible for assistance under the AFDC-FC program, which preceded the passage of the CWA.244 Under the
AFDC-FC program,245 there were four requirements for a child to
be eligible to have financial assistance provided to his or her caregiver: (1) the child must have been removed from his or her home
only after a determination by the state that remaining in the
home was “contrary to the welfare” of the child; (2) in the month
prior to removal, the child must have been eligible for assistance
under the AFDC program, and the child’s parent(s) or guardian(s)
must have been receiving payments at the time of removal; (3) the
child must have been removed by the state agency tasked with
providing AFDC assistance; and (4) the child must be placed in a
foster home that has been approved by the state.246
Congress literally wrote the continuity between the AFDCFC program and the CWA into § 672, which accounts for all four
of these eligibility requirements. First, a child’s foster caregiver
242

Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1199.
42 USC § 671(a).
244 See 2011 Green Book at *2 (cited in note 60).
245 See notes 32–35 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the historical origins of AFDC-FC programs in the early 1960s.
246 2011 Green Book at *2–3 (cited in note 60). Under the AFDC program, states were
required “to provide cash assistance to all eligible families. Working within federal limitations, the states administered the program, established the income level below which
families qualified for assistance in that state, and set the level of benefits that eligible
families would receive there.” Stephen B. Page and Mary B. Larner, Introduction to the
AFDC Program, 7 The Future of Children 20, 21 (1997). See also notes 28–34 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the growth of the AFDC and AFDC-FC programs
during the 1960–1970s.
243
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is eligible for foster care maintenance payments only if the foster
child’s parents voluntarily agreed to removal or if there has been
a judicial determination that continuing in the home “would be
contrary to the welfare of the child.”247 Second, a foster child’s
caregiver is eligible for foster care maintenance payments if “the
child, while in the home, would have met the AFDC eligibility requirement.”248 Third, the state agency that submits state plans for
federal assistance must also be the agency responsible for the
child’s placement.249 Fourth, a child must be placed in a “foster
family home or child-care institution”250 as defined by the statute,251 and only foster families and childcare institutions are entitled to receive foster care maintenance payments from the
state.252 Thus, the CWA incorporated and preserved the AFDCFC program’s four eligibility requirements for foster children
whose caregivers are entitled to receive payments.
Other structural features of § 672 also indicate that the title
of § 672(a)(1) refers to children whose foster caregivers are entitled to receive foster care maintenance payments. For example,
§ 672(a)(4) is titled “Eligibility of certain alien children,”253 and
§ 672(i) is titled “Administrative costs associated with otherwise
eligible children not in licensed foster care settings.”254 Each of
these titles reinforces the conclusion that § 672(a)(1) is “phrased
in terms benefiting” foster children and their caregivers,255 with
the CWA identifying foster parents and foster care institutions as
the direct recipients of payments. The right to foster care maintenance payments is inextricably linked to the eligibility of foster
children.
The Brook Amendment provision, which the Wright Court
held conferred an enforceable right under § 1983, had a similar

247

42 USC § 672(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
42 USC § 672(a)(1)(B). See also notes 59–61 for a discussion of the eligibility requirements for foster care maintenance payments under the CWA.
249 42 USC § 672(a)(2)(B)(i). Alternatively, the state agency that submits state plans
under § 671 may enter into agreement with another state agency or an “Indian tribe or a
tribal organization” for the purposes of managing foster child placement. See 42 USC
§ 672(a)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
250 42 USC § 672(a)(2)(C).
251 See 42 USC § 672(c) (defining “foster family home” and “child-care institution”).
252 See 42 USC § 672(b) (identifying the recipients of foster care maintenance payments on behalf of children who are eligible under § 672(a)).
253 42 USC § 672(a)(4).
254 42 USC § 672(i).
255 See Wilder, 496 US at 510.
248
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structure that identified the eligible beneficiaries under the statute. The original title of that provision was “Families included;
amount,”256 and at the time Wright was decided, the statute included eligibility requirements for a family to qualify for public
housing at rents with hard-capped rates.257 The Court held that
the statute conferred an enforceable right because the provision
unambiguously identified which families were eligible for public
housing at reduced rates.258 The Court found that it “could not be
clearer” who was entitled to public housing and how the rates
should be calculated and that Congress’s “intent to benefit tenants was undeniable.”259
The most noticeable difference between the structure of the
CWA and that of the statutory provisions at issue in Wright and
Wilder is that the CWA’s definition for foster care maintenance
payments—a term that is vague on its own—is found not in
§ 672(a) but rather in § 675(4)(A).260 The Eighth Circuit took issue
with the fact that this statutory provision is found in a definitional section, and citing an Eleventh Circuit case, it maintained
that “an enforceable right [located] solely within a purely definitional section is antithetical to requiring unambiguous congressional intent.”261 This contention is misplaced for two reasons.
First, the Eleventh Circuit case, 31 Foster Children v Bush,262
cited Gonzaga and two district court cases to support the asserted
rule that statutory provisions that are definitional in nature cannot on their own create enforceable rights under § 1983.263 But
Gonzaga asserted no such rule, and the Eleventh Circuit cited a

256

42 USC § 1437a(a) (1988).
42 USC § 1437a(a) (1988).
258 Wright, 479 US at 430.
259 Id.
260 Section 675 is titled “Definitions,” and it defines “foster care maintenance payments” as payments covering “food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a
child’s personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel
to the child’s home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school
in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.” 42 USC § 675(4)(A).
261 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1197, citing 31 Foster Children v Bush, 329 F3d
1255, 1271 (11th Cir 2003).
262 329 F3d 1255 (11th Cir 2003).
263 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 280 (finding
that, because the statutory provisions at issue “are definitional in nature, they alone cannot and do not supply a basis for conferring rights enforceable under § 1983”). See also
Charlie H. v Whitman, 83 F Supp 2d 476, 490 (D NJ 2000) (finding that § 675(5), standing
alone, does not confer a right enforceable under § 1983); B.H. v Johnson, 715 F Supp 1387,
1401 (ND Ill 1989) (“It would be strange for Congress to create enforceable rights in the
definitional section of a statute.”).
257
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page of the Gonzaga opinion that contains no language about the
ability to enforce a statutory right that is located solely in a definitional section of a statute.264 Moreover, the word “definition” is
not found anywhere in the Gonzaga opinion.265 Thus, there is no
Supreme Court precedent for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’
asserted rule that is binding on the present analysis.
But suppose, for a moment, that the asserted rule were binding on the present analysis. The rule still would not foreclose enforcement of the right to foster care maintenance payments because the statutory right is not located solely within the
definitional section of the CWA. Rather, the statutory right arises
from the language of § 672(a)(1) in conjunction with the definition
provided by § 675(4)(A). Whereas § 672(a) places a binding obligation on states to make foster care maintenance payments and
identifies the individuals entitled to such payments, § 675(4)(A)
provides the content of right by defining what the payments must
cover. Far from being solely located in § 675(4)(A), the statutory
language addressing the right to foster care maintenance payments is instead primarily located in § 672(a), which is not a definitional section. However, § 675(4)(A) provides helpful clarity as
to what the right to foster care maintenance payments entails.
And without the specific definition in § 675(4)(A), the right to foster care maintenance payments would possibly be too vague and
amorphous for enforcement under § 1983.266
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that a right
that is located in a definitional section may be enforceable if the
right is also referenced elsewhere in the statute. In 31 Foster
Children, the plaintiffs asserted a right to particular procedures
under a case review system that is compliant with the CWA.267 At
the time the case was decided, § 671(a)(16) required state plans
to incorporate a case review system that “meets the requirements
described in” § 675(5)(B).268 The plaintiffs argued that states must
also comply with § 675(5)(D)–(E), the definitional provisions that
included the specific language regarding the right asserted by the
264 The Eleventh Circuit opinion cited to page 280 of Gonzaga for support of the rule
that a definitional statute “alone cannot and do[es] not supply a basis for conferring rights
enforceable under § 1983.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271.
265 See generally Gonzaga, 536 US 273.
266 Recall that the second factor of the Blessing test is whether “the right assertedly
protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain
judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 US at 340–41. See text accompanying notes 181–82.
267 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271.
268 See id.
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plaintiffs.269 But the Eleventh Circuit found that § 671(a)(16)
plainly required compliance only with § 675(5)(B) and not with
§ 675(5)(D)–(E).270 Nevertheless, the court implied that the plaintiffs may have had a stronger case if § 671(a)(16) conditioned federal funding on a state’s compliance with all of § 675(5).271 In contrast, § 671(a)(1) requires state plans to provide for foster care
maintenance payments as a condition for receiving federal funding, and states must do so “in accordance with” § 672 in its entirety. Section 672 is not a definitional section, and it incorporates
the definition of foster care maintenance payments provided by
§ 675(4)(A).272
2. The text of § 672 employs rights-creating language.
Section 672 contains rights-creating language because it is
“phrased in terms of the persons benefited” rather than the entity
regulated.273 The rights-creating language within § 672 comprises
three elements: (1) the statutory right being created (“foster care
maintenance payments on behalf of each child” who qualifies274);
(2) the source providing and protecting the right (“[e]ach State
with a plan approved under this part”275); and (3) the individuals
entitled to the right (each “foster family”276 and “child-care institution”277 caring for an eligible child). Viewed as a whole, these
three elements clarify what right is being created, who is responsible for providing and protecting the right, and who is entitled to
the right.
In comparing § 672 to provisions at issue in other Supreme
Court cases, the circuit courts did not break down the provisions
into these three constituent parts. However, the provision of the

269

See id.
See id (“[The plaintiffs] argue that we should not interpret § 671(a)(16) to require
compliance only with § 675(5)(B) in order for states to receive federal funds, but we think
that is the most logical interpretation.”).
271 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271 (finding that, because § 671(a)(16) “does
not go beyond” requiring compliance with § 675(5)(B) and “explicitly require[s] a plan to
meet the requirements described in §§ 675(5)(D) and (E),” the latter provisions are not
required conditions for federal funding and thus not enforceable on their own).
272 See 42 USC § 672(b)(2) (noting that the term “foster care maintenance payments”
is defined in § 675(4)(A)).
273 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 284, quoting Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677,
692 n 13 (1979).
274 42 USC § 672(a)(1).
275 42 USC § 672(a)(1).
276 42 USC § 672(b)(1).
277 42 USC § 672(b)(2).
270
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Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which the Wilder Court
found enforceable under § 1983, consisted of the same three elements. First, the asserted right was “rates” that would yield “reasonable and adequate” reimbursements for medical services.278
Second, the entity tasked with providing the right was any state
that submitted “a State plan for medical assistance.”279 To receive
approval, state plans were required to include rates for calculating reimbursements, “which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate.”280 Third, the beneficiaries of the right were medical
providers offering “inpatient hospital services” to “individuals
[who are] eligible” for Medicaid.281 The states, not the federal government, were responsible for protecting medical providers’ right
to reimbursements at reasonable rates, and medical providers
could sue under § 1983 to enforce that right.
Breaking down the statutory provision’s language is helpful
to distinguish between statutes in which Congress intended to
create an enforceable right and statutes that merely have the effect of benefitting certain groups.282 First, plaintiffs seeking to enforce a right under § 1983 must cite specific statutory text entitling them to a right rather than a statute conferring some
generalized benefit or set of undefined rights.283 For example, in
Blessing, the Court found that it is “incumbent” upon plaintiffs
“to identify with particularity the rights they [have] claimed.”284
There, the plaintiffs sued their state for failing to comply with
Title IV-D of the SSA, which governs state payments to qualifying
families under the AFDC program. However, the plaintiffs did not
identify any specific provisions within Title IV-D entitling them
to particular rights, and thus the Court refused to allow the plaintiffs to force their state to provide any of the benefits contained
within the law.285

278

See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
280 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
281 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
282 See Blessing, 520 US at 342 (“Only when [a] complaint is broken down into manageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the various criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.”).
283 See id (noting that “it is impossible [for courts] to determine whether [an entire
statute], as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined ‘rights’”).
284 See id.
285 See id.
279
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After identifying the statutory provision containing the asserted right, plaintiffs must show that the language of the statute
directly addresses the individuals entitled to the right. The statutory provision must require that states take certain actions to
provide or protect the right in all circumstances. Thus, an asserted right must be more than a system-wide policy that produces certain benefits.286 In Gonzaga, the Court found that students could not enforce a right to privacy under the provision in
question because the provision did not prohibit individual disclosure of student records. Instead, the provision prohibited states
from having a “policy or practice” of disclosing educational records
of students without consent or else risk losing funding.287 If the
statute had explicitly said that state educational institutions
would lose funding if they disclosed an individual student’s records, then the plaintiff would have likely had a stronger claim for
being able to sue under § 1983. However, the plaintiff in Gonzaga
failed to show that the FERPA provision entitled each individual
student to a right to privacy in all instances.
The Eighth Circuit compared the language of § 672(a) to that
of the FERPA provision in Gonzaga, and the court “[a]dmittedly”
stated that § 672(a) “do[es] not explicitly proclaim ‘no funds shall
be made available to match a state’s foster care maintenance payments if the state has certain reimbursement policies or practices,’ as the exact analogue of the statute at issue in Gonzaga
would.”288 The Eighth Circuit nevertheless viewed the differences
between the actual text of the CWA and its hypothetical “analogue” to be immaterial; however, in doing so, it glossed over at
least three reasons for why the CWA’s language tips the scale in
favor of a focus on individual rights, not on state compliance.
First, the Eighth Circuit’s analogue distorted the focus of the
actual text of § 672(a) because it omits the intended beneficiaries
of the provision: foster caregivers whose foster children meet the
eligibility criteria. By not explicitly identifying the intended
beneficiaries of the provision and the interests of children, the
Eighth Circuit’s analogue stripped a key element from the CWA’s
rights-creating language, and thus the focus was “two steps

286 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 300 (Stevens dissenting) (noting that the Court has held
that “generalized,” “systemwide” duties on States do not create enforceable rights under
§ 1983).
287 See 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1).
288 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 279.
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removed from the interests of individual”289 foster children and
foster caregivers.
Second, by invoking federal funding, the Eighth Circuit’s
analogue replaced § 672’s individualized focus on the relationship
between states and foster caregivers with an aggregate focus on
the relationship between the federal government and state
compliance.
Third, unlike the actual text of § 672, the Eighth Circuit’s
analogue did not require states to make foster care maintenance
payments to each child’s foster caregiver. Instead, it requires
states to refrain only from certain, undefined “reimbursement
policies.” A state could have a policy of making foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child yet fail to comply by its
own policy in all instances and still maintain “substantial conformity” with the CWA. The Eighth Circuit’s analogue would not
prohibit federal funding as long as a state does not adopt a restricted policy. However, the plain text of § 672 does not require
states to choose or refrain from certain policies. It affords no such
discretion, for it requires full compliance with respect to each individual child. Therefore, the focus of the text is on state action
vis-à-vis each child—not on a state’s general policies regarding
foster caregivers and children in the aggregate.
B.

Contextualizing the CWA

The legislative history and purpose of the CWA provide evidence that Congress intended for foster caregivers to be able to
enforce their right to foster care maintenance payments.
Section 1983 enforcement is crucial for ensuring that states uphold their obligations to foster caregivers and foster children under the CWA. If § 1983 enforcement of the right to foster care
maintenance payments were to become entirely unavailable, foster caregivers would have very few other options for remedying a
state’s noncompliance. Because showing that Congress intended
a statute to confer an enforceable right is also a requisite element
of establishing that a statute contains an implied right of action,
the foreclosure of § 1983 enforcement would likely also preclude
enforcement through an implied right of action.290
289

Gonzaga, 536 US at 287.
See notes 146–47 and accompanying text. See also Ashish Prasad, Comment,
Rights without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act, 60 U Chi L Rev 197, 198 (1993) (arguing that “the Supreme Court has adopted a
strong presumption against implied rights of action”).
290
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Section 1983 enforcement is the most appropriate mechanism
for protecting the rights of foster caregivers in a way that best
promotes the interests of foster children. When private enforcement is unavailable, Pennhurst and Gonzaga instruct that “the
typical remedy for state noncompliance” with Spending Clause
legislation is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but
rather terminating a state’s federal funding.291 Accordingly, because the Eighth Circuit found that § 1983 actions were not available to foster caregivers, the court advised the plaintiffs that their
federal remedy was to ask the federal government to stop providing reimbursements to their state for foster care maintenance
payments.292 However, for a foster caregiver to ask the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to terminate funding to her state
for failing to comply with the CWA would not protect her right to
foster care maintenance payments or serve the interests of the
foster child in her care. In fact, such a “remedy” would only make
matters worse for foster children living in her state.
This Section argues that the legislative history and purpose
of the CWA provide further evidence that Congress intended for
foster caregivers to have an enforceable right to foster care
maintenance payments under § 1983. Part III.B.1 examines how
§ 1983 actions to enforce the right to foster care maintenance payments appropriately further the legislative purpose of the CWA.
Part III.B.2 responds to courts and legal scholars who oppose expanding the scope of § 1983 actions by showing that § 1983 enforcement of foster care maintenance payments does not pose the
federalism and separation of powers concerns these critics raise.
Finally, Part III.B.3 posits that the context of the CWA’s enactment and subsequent legislative history support the conclusion
that Congress intended the right to foster care maintenance payments to be enforceable under § 1983.
1. Foster care maintenance payments and the CWA’s
purpose.
The CWA provides no remedy for foster caregivers to enforce
the right to foster care maintenance payments, and arguing that
Congress intended to create a remedy through an implied right of

291

Pennhurst, 451 US at 28; Gonzaga, 536 US at 280.
See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202–03 (instructing the “[foster] [p]roviders
[that their] federal remedy [was] to seek termination of matching funds as a consequence
for [their] state’s shortcomings”).
292
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action is incredibly difficult.293 Unlike plaintiffs suing under an
implied cause of action, plaintiffs “suing under § 1983 do not have
the burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of
rights secured by federal statutes.”294 Given that there is no federal review mechanism within the CWA through which foster
caregivers can submit claims, suing under § 1983 is the most viable and efficient option for foster caregivers to force their state to
make adequate foster care maintenance payments in accordance
with the CWA.
Because foster care maintenance payments occur after a child
has been removed from his or her home, they do not directly bear
on the CWA’s purpose of preserving families and preventing unnecessary removals. However, they do indirectly further the CWA’s
purpose of reunifying families by covering the costs of “reasonable
travel to the child’s home for visitation.”295 Section 675a(b) includes
a “List of rights” for foster children, and one of these rights is “visitation” with a child’s parent(s) or guardian(s).296 Ensuring children
receive their right to routine visitations with their families is critical for preserving familial bonds between foster children and their
parents, and adequate foster care maintenance payments further
this goal by covering the costs of travel and time expended. Moreover, by enabling periodic visitations between a foster child and her
parents, foster care maintenance payments may increase the likelihood that reunification will occur more quickly, thereby avoiding
the harms caused by foster care drift297 and “perpetual states of familial uncertainty.”298
The phenomenon of foster care drift—in which foster children
are shuffled between multiple foster homes for indefinite periods
of time—was one of the pivotal forces that motivated Congress to
enact the CWA.299 Child welfare advocates and many members of
Congress were worried in the late 1970s that too many children
293 See Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 286 (2001) (“The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy. . . . Statutory intent on this latter point
is determinative.”) (emphasis added).
294 Gonzaga, 536 US at 284.
295 42 USC § 675(4)(A).
296 42 USC § 675a(4)(1).
297 See Bailie, 66 Fordham L Rev at 2289 (cited in note 39). See also Smith v
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 838 n 41 (1977)
(describing harms in the foster care system).
298 See Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 61 (cited in note 36).
299 See text accompanying notes 42–54.
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were being moved into foster care and being floated between multiple homes. Despite the noble ambitions of the CWA in tackling
foster care drift, this problem continues to plague the foster care
system today, and lack of funding is a persistent obstacle to realizing the full potential of the CWA.300 The effects of this problem
are often dire and irreversible. According to a report by the
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), foster care has profound
effects on a child’s cognitive and social development,301 and subjecting a foster child to multiple placements can be especially “injurious” to a child’s psychological development.302 Thus, the AAP
emphasizes that foster children “need continuity, consistency,
and predictability from their caregiver.”303
Professors Brian Duncan and Laura Arys advise policymakers that foster care drift and multiple placements can be reduced
in part by ensuring that foster caregivers are equipped with the
proper resources to meet the needs of the foster children entrusted to their care.304 In a 2007 empirical study, Duncan and
Arys investigated “whether more generous foster care payments
lead to more stable placements.”305 The study found that “the financial compensation paid by states can have a significant impact
on the experiences of children in foster homes” by promoting stability and ensuring that a foster child has adequate resources.306
According to the study, a $100 increase in foster care maintenance payments would “decrease the number of times the average
child is moved from one foster placement to another by 20%.”307
Finally, the study also concluded that the size of foster care

300 See Elisa Kawam, Revisiting the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980: Analysis, Critique, and Recommendations, 1 World J Soc Science Rsrch 23, 35 (2014)
(suggesting that, in the years following the passage of the CWA, “the argument over funding and implementation took center stage [in Congress and in public policy debates] instead of prioritizing the needs of the families and children who are served by the child
welfare system”).
301 According to the AAP, foster care “experiences are critical in the short- and longterm development of a child’s brain and the ability to subsequently participate fully in
society.” In addition, foster children “have disproportionately high rates of physical,
developmental, and mental health problems.” See American Academy of Pediatrics,
Committee on Early Childhood, Adoption and Dependent Care, Developmental Issues for
Young Children in Foster Care, 106 Pediatrics 1145, 1145 (2000).
302 See id at 1149.
303 See id.
304 Brian Duncan and Laura Argys, Economic Incentives and Foster Care Placement,
74 S Econ J 114, 135, 139–40 (2007).
305 Id at 135.
306 Id at 140.
307 Id at 11.
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maintenance payments has a “statistically significant effect on a
family’s willingness to take in a foster child.”308 Thus, forcing
states to make adequate foster care maintenance payments directly confronts the problem of foster care drift. Active private enforcement deters underpayment of foster care maintenance payments, enabling more individuals to become and remain foster
caregivers throughout the entire duration of their foster child’s
placement. By reducing the likelihood of multiple placements, adequate foster care maintenance payments also minimize the potentially detrimental effects that removal and prolonged placement in foster care can have on a child’s psychological
development and well-being.
2. Criticisms of expansive § 1983 enforcement.
By expanding the scope of § 1983 to include enforcement of
statutory rights, Thiboutot represented a major turning point for
§ 1983 litigation.309 The Court’s holding faced forceful criticism almost immediately.310 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Lewis Powell
warned that the Court’s decision “create[d] a major new intrusion
into state sovereignty under our federal system.”311 However,
§ 1983 actions to enforce federal statutes were far from uncommon when Thiboutot was decided, and some commentators have
argued that the “conclusion in Thiboutot conformed to the majority position in the lower federal courts.”312
Criticism of expansive § 1983 enforcement of statutory rights
has taken a variety of forms, including pragmatic concerns and
critiques based on federalism and separation of powers.313 Critics

308

Duncan and Argys, 74 S Econ J at 139 (cited in note 304).
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement
of Federal Election Laws, 44 Ind L Rev 113, 133 (2010) (describing Thiboutot as the “seminal case for private plaintiffs suing under § 1983 for statutory violations”). See also notes
82–87 and accompanying text.
310 See, for example, John R. Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdiction: A
Call for Restraint, 55 St John’s L Rev 219, 229 (1981) (“Thiboutot’s expansive interpretation of section 1983 poses a threat to the balance of federal/state relations.”).
311 Thiboutot, 448 US at 33 (Powell dissenting).
312 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 397 n 17 (cited in note 21).
313 See, for example, Linnet Davis-Stermitz, Comment, Stigma plus Whom? Evaluating Causation in Multiple-Actor Stigma-Plus Claims, 84 U Chi L Rev 1883, 1894–95 (2017)
(arguing that “[t]he modern § 1983 has been a lightning rod for criticism,” with objections
pointing to an “outsized impact on federal dockets,” a reduction of “collegiality and predictability,” and a host of federalism concerns).
309
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have pointed to the “litigation explosion”314 following Thiboutot
and the resulting “burdens on federal courts”315 and “financial
burden[s] on [ ] states” defending against § 1983 actions.316 Moreover, critics have highlighted a host of “federalism concerns that
arise when plaintiffs . . . procure a federal injunction that will
compel changes in the operation of a state institution.”317 Underscoring much of the criticism is a discomfort that § 1983 actions
may “interfere[ ] with the states’ ability to manage their own governmental activities” and transfer greater power to federal courts
to shape federal laws and policies.318 Justice Harry Blackmun,
however, argued that the “so-called federalism ‘problem’ . . . is
largely an illusory one.”319 This is because § 1983 is “only a vehicle
for substantive claims that have their base elsewhere. It is not an
independent source of constitutional or statutory rights.”320
But in the context of Spending Clause legislation, the federal
government also has the option to cut off the statute’s entire funding stream for a state’s noncompliance. Imagine if the plaintiffs
who lost in Midwest Foster Care followed the Eighth Circuit’s advice and asked the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
stop providing federal funding under the CWA to their state. If
successful, the effects of such a remedy would be widely felt by
foster caregivers and foster children throughout the entire state.
In addition, the capacity of state agencies to provide foster care
and adoptive services would be severely crippled. Compared to
such a drastic measure, § 1983 actions are far less intrusive on a
state’s autonomy. A plaintiff who successfully sues under § 1983
to force her state to pay adequate foster care maintenance payments would simply force the state to pay damages. The § 1983
remedy protects the rights of the foster caregiver without destabilizing state agencies or interfering with the rights and interests

314 See Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading
Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
72 NC L Rev 1085, 1085 (1994).
315 See Taylor Van Hove, Comment, Fraud, Mistake, and Section 1983 Prison Claims:
Why the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Should Be Amended to Require Heightened
Pleading for Section 1983 Inmate Litigation, 65 DePaul L Rev 213, 233 (2015).
316 Bartels, 55 St John’s L Rev at 229–30 (cited in note 310).
317 Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich L Rev 5, 30 (1980).
318 Id at 36.
319 Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 NYU L Rev 1, 22 (1985).
320 Id.
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of other foster caregivers and foster children in a state.321 Thus, it
makes little sense to deny families a § 1983 remedy based on an
assumption that private enforcement might somehow burden
state autonomy more than a full-scale funding prohibition would.
Federalism concerns are less pronounced when a plaintiff
sues for damages than when a plaintiff sues for equitable relief.322
In the former instance, “section 1983 damage suits require no
conclusion that the state process is improper.”323 The Court’s
§ 1983 jurisprudence suggests a greater willingness to uphold the
enforceability of monetary entitlements when a federal law is
specific and lacks any review mechanism.324 In contrast, suits in
equity “involve a specific request to enjoin a state act.”325 When a
statutory provision is vague, a plaintiff’s request for an injunction
may result in federal judges supplanting the authority of state
agencies tasked with implementation of a federal law with their
own personal judgments about how the law should be
implemented.

321 The likelihood that litigation would deter unlawful conduct by states was also a
“key factor” for courts determining if Congress intended a statute to contain an implied
right of action. See Frankel, 67 Va L Rev at 556 (cited in note 71) (analyzing the deterrent
effect of implied causes of action on states under the securities laws). But see Bivens v Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 407–08 (1971)
(Harlan concurring) (citations omitted):

[T]he appropriateness of according [the plaintiff] compensatory relief does not
turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct.
Damages as a traditional form of compensation for invasion of a legally protected
interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on
future official lawlessness might be thought to result. [The plaintiff], after all,
has invoked judicial processes claiming entitlement to compensation for injuries
resulting from allegedly lawless official behavior, if those injuries are properly
compensable in money damages.
322 See Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 7 n 20 (cited in note 317) (“The federalism problems created by civil rights litigation are raised most dramatically by suits in equity, which
seek direct interference by federal judges in state activities.”). While plaintiffs may bring
§ 1983 actions to seek damages or equitable relief for violations of Spending Clause legislation, the Supreme Court’s small track record suggests a greater willingness to authorize
§ 1983 actions seeking damages. In Pennhurst, Suter, and Blessing, the plaintiffs sued for
equitable relief, while in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga, the plaintiffs sued for damages.
The Court allowed only the plaintiffs in Wright and Wilder to proceed.
323 Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 30 (cited in note 317).
324 See text accompanying notes 208–10.
325 Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 30 (cited in note 317). See also Note, Developments in
the Law, 90 Harv L Rev at 1185 (cited in note 78) (“Th[e] traditional model of federal-state
relations in the context of federal court adjudication . . . begins to break down when one
considers those actions which are most often thought to threaten the functioning of the
state—the modern injunctive suit.”).
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Section 1983 enforcement of the CWA’s foster care maintenance payment provisions does not curtail the flexibility of each
state to administer foster care services in the way it views most
proper.326 Foster caregivers suing for inadequate foster care
maintenance payments are not asking federal courts to usurp the
authority of state agencies to design their own foster care
plans327—they are simply asking that foster care maintenance
payments cover the costs they are supposed to cover. Although
litigation is limited only to the parties in a given case,328 § 1983
actions to enforce foster care maintenance payments may lead
states “to take steps to reduce injuries whenever the steps appear
less costly than the injuries they prevent.”329 Thus, the prospect
of costly litigation would likely motivate states to ensure that the
foster care maintenance payments they provide to foster caregivers are adequate and in accordance with the law. While compliance may require states to expend greater resources to increase
the size of foster care maintenance payments, these financial burdens are largely overstated because the federal government reimburses states for the majority of its expenditures on foster care
maintenance payments.330
As for separation of powers concerns, § 1983 enforcement of
the foster care maintenance payments provision does not supplant
the authority of the Department of Health and Human
Services because there is no federal mechanism through which the
agency can review individual claims. Moreover, the Department of
Health and Human Services still retains the authority to revoke
funding due to a state’s noncompliance.331 In addition, § 1983 does

326 See Note, Developments in the Law, 90 Harv L Rev at 1190 (cited in note 78) (arguing that, “at least in the damage action context, the federal intrusion into state affairs
is a narrow one, limited to adjudicating the claim of the particular plaintiff and leaving
plenary operational authority to the existing state and local agencies”).
327 See id at 1189–90 (arguing that “the principle of assuring state and local effectiveness in performing the functions those units of government have assumed is not necessarily impaired by section 1983 suits”).
328 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev
1281, 1282–83 (1976) (explaining that “the lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private rights” and listing five “defining features of . . . civil
adjudication”).
329 Note, Developments in the Law, 90 Harv L Rev at 1218 (cited in note 78) (arguing
that “[d]amage remedies imposed on governmental entities could serve to prevent injuries
to individuals by the system as a whole”).
330 See 42 USC § 674(a). The rate of federal reimbursement for a state “shall in no
case be less than 50 per centum or more than 83 per centum.” 42 USC § 1396d(b).
331 See 42 USC § 1320a-2a.
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not greatly interfere with the domain of state agencies because suing for damages under § 1983 requires a court only to determine
whether the plaintiff’s asserted right has been violated and to
award damages when necessary. Monetary damages do not require
state agencies to forfeit autonomy in how they design and administer child welfare services; however, equitable relief, such as an
injunction, likely would. As mentioned above, § 1983 actions solve
underenforcement problems that stem from the lack of a robust review mechanism, and the deterrent effect of potentially costly litigation encourages state agencies to design and implement foster
care systems that are more faithful to the requirements imposed
by the CWA.332 In sum, § 1983 enforcement merely ensures that
the CWA does what Congress designed it to do.
3. The CWA’s enactment in the context of § 1983 cases and
the CWA’s legislative history.
Even before the CWA was enacted, foster caregivers had
brought § 1983 actions to enforce foster payments to which they
were entitled under the previous AFDC-FC program. Although
the CWA does not include an explicit private right of action to
enforce foster care maintenance payments, Congress was likely
aware of increasingly common § 1983 litigation when it enacted
the law.333 Based on the legal context of the CWA’s enactment and
later legislative history, this Section argues that Congress intended for foster caregivers to be able to bring § 1983 actions to
enforce their right to foster care maintenance payments.
One year before the enactment of the CWA, in Miller v
Youakim,334 the Supreme Court authorized a foster parent to
bring constitutional and statutory claims under § 1983 in order to
enforce her right to foster care assistance in accordance with the

332

See notes 321, 329–40, and accompanying text.
See Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting:
A Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575, 597–605 (2002) (discussing the extent to
which members of Congress draft laws with an awareness of the “range of legal sources
that courts typically consult in construing statutes, such as case law”); Cannon v
University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 699 (1979) (“In sum, it is not only appropriate but also
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with these unusually important precedents from this and other federal courts and that it expected its enactment
to be interpreted in conformity with them.”). The Court had held that SSA provisions were
properly enforced through § 1983 actions. See, for example, Edelman v Jordan, 415 US
651, 675 (1974) (noting that “suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States”).
334 440 US 125 (1979).
333
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AFDC-FC program.335 The Court observed that, under the AFDCFC program, “[a] participating State may not deny assistance to
persons who meet eligibility standards defined in the Social
Security Act.”336 The following year, Congress transferred the
AFDC-FC program, which was previously located in Title IV-A of
the Social Security Act, to the CWA.337 The eligibility requirements for payments under the AFDC-FC program were imported
into § 672(a) and became the eligibility requirements for foster
care maintenance payments.338 Although the CWA provided more
specific language for what foster care maintenance payments
must cover,339 the statutory provisions regarding eligibility for foster care maintenance payments did not change significantly when
the CWA became law.
The continuity between the AFDC-FC program and the CWA
and the fact that foster caregivers had already sued under § 1983
to enforce foster payments suggest that Congress likely anticipated that § 1983 actions to enforce foster care maintenance payments would continue.340 Although Congress did not explicitly
state that private actions were available under the CWA, it did
not explicitly foreclose them either.
The legislative history of the CWA’s enactment is also of little
help on the question of private enforcement. However, only one
year before the CWA passed, the Court acknowledged in Cannon
v University of Chicago341 that it was “not necessary” for a plaintiff
to show congressional intent to create a private right of action so
long as a statute confers a class of citizens with a right and does
not expressly foreclose private enforcement of the right.342 After a
335

See id at 146.
See id at 133–34.
337 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, HR 3434, 96th Cong, 1st Sess
in 126 Cong Rec S 14766 (June 13, 1980) (“[The CWA] transfer[s] the existing foster care
maintenance program from title IV-A to the new title IV-E.”). Recall that the CWA created
Title IV-E of the SSA.
338 See notes 244–52 and accompanying text.
339 See text accompanying note 182.
340 See note 333 and accompanying text.
341 441 US 677 (1979).
342 See id at 694 (“[I]n situations . . . ‘in which it is clear that federal law has granted
a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private
cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling.’”), quoting Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 82 (1975). See also Chapman v Houston Welfare
Rights Organization, 441 US 600, 672 (1979) (White concurring in the judgment) (stating
that statutory rights may be “protected and vindicated under § 1983 . . . unless there is
clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that
for various other reasons a § 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional intention”).
336
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plaintiff shows that a statute creates a right, the burden shifts to
the state to show that Congress did not intend for the right to be
privately enforceable under § 1983.343 Gonzaga affirmed this
burden-shifting rule.344 This context is significant because it implies that Congress was aware that private actions under § 1983
were commonly initiated to enforce the SSA’s provisions and, in
particular, the provisions of the AFDC-FC program. Nothing in
the text or legislative history of the CWA’s enactment indicates
that Congress intended for the right to such payments to no
longer be enforceable after passing the CWA.
Postenactment legislative history further supports the view
that Congress intended for foster families to be able to enforce the
CWA’s provisions. Just three years after Congress passed the
CWA, Senator Alan Cranston, one of the law’s chief architects,
lamented that many of the CWA’s provisions were not being forcefully implemented by states. The senator insisted that the CWA’s
provisions are privately enforceable, arguing that
the authority granted to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to withhold or reduce funding to a State for noncompliance was not intended to be an exclusive remedy. . . . [A]s
my statements on the Senate floor during the several years
that this legislation was being developed made clear, the intended beneficiaries of [the CWA] were and continue to be
the children who are in foster care or are in danger of being
placed in foster care.345
Foster children are dependent on foster caregivers to use
these payments to meet their basic needs.346 In most circumstances, because of the dependent status of children, enforcing
any provision of the CWA in court requires that a foster child’s

343 See note 342. See also Middlesex County Sewage Authority v National Sea
Clammers Association, 453 US 1, 20 n 31 (1981) (“[W]e do not suggest that the burden is
on a plaintiff to demonstrate congressional intent to preserve § 1983 remedies.”).
344 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 284 (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers
an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.”); id at 284 n 4 (“The
State may rebut this presumption by showing that Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
345 Implementation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 98th
Cong, 1st Sess, in 129 Cong Rec S 10282–83 (daily ed Apr 28, 1983) (“1983 CWA
Implementation”) (letter from Senator Cranston).
346 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Case against Separating the Care from the Caregiver: Reuniting Caregivers’ Rights and Children’s Rights, 15 Nevada L J 236, 242 (2014)
(“[The] relationships that are necessitated by children’s dependency are fundamental to
children’s needs.”).
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caregiver sue on behalf of the child under § 1983.347 Senator
Cranston stressed that
[t]here should be no question that these children have standing to seek enforcement of this law in order to secure the benefits and protections that Congress intended they receive. . . .
It is sad that it takes a court order to bring that about, but
that appears to be the only way to achieve faithful execution
of this law under the [current administration].348
This postenactment legislative history supports the inference
that Congress intended for the CWA to create statutory rights
that are privately enforceable, either directly by foster children
or, more likely in most cases, by parents and caregivers on behalf
of children.349
Because the Court in Suter held the “reasonable efforts”
provision to be unenforceable under § 1983,350 the CWA’s goal of
preventing and de-incentivizing unnecessary removals likely
cannot be fully realized unless Congress decides to act. However,
the foster care maintenance payment provisions should still be
enforceable to serve the needs of foster children, to combat the
problems of multiple placements and foster care drift, and to
further the CWA’s goal of timely reunification of foster children
with their families.351 When Congress passed the Suter fix, it did
not express outright that all provisions of the CWA were privately
enforceable, but it did imply that at least some, or perhaps most,
provisions were enforceable through § 1983 actions.352 The
347 See id at 242 (2014) (arguing that “judges and legislators should focus on supporting [ ] caregiver-child relationships. The child and his or her custodians have an inseparable interdependent relationship and this relational nature of children’s lives cannot be
ignored; the caregiver and the care that a child needs cannot be completely separated.”).
See also Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s
Rights, 9 Harv Women’s L J 1, 5, 16 (1986):

Legal rules that imply that only independent people may enjoy rights fictionalize
the actual grant of rights to people who remain dependent in many ways.
...
[For people who are dependent on others,] legal rules foster relationships: relationships of care, protection, and perhaps, at times, chosen affiliation.
348 1983 CWA Implementation Letter, 129 Cong Rec S at 10282–83 (letter from
Senator Cranston) (cited in note 345).
349 See Laufer-Ukeles, 15 Nevada L J at 253 (cited in note 346) (arguing that “it is the
parents who struggle for [children’s] rights against the state, and children are the
beneficiaries”).
350 See notes 132–36 and accompanying text.
351 See notes 295–308 and accompanying text.
352 See 42 USC § 1320a-2.
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legislative history of the Suter fix explains that, “in establishing
‘State plan’ programs under the Social Security Act, Congress
meant . . . to permit those injured by State officials’ failure to
[comply with federal statutory standards] . . . to challenge,
through appropriate judicial actions, that failure.”353 Ultimately,
the goal of the Suter fix was “to assure that individuals who have
been injured by a state’s failure to comply with the state plan
requirements are able to seek redress in the federal courts.”354
This strongly indicates that Congress intended provisions of the
CWA to be enforceable under § 1983.
CONCLUSION
While the CWA gives states considerable flexibility to implement their own foster care systems, it also places firm obligations
on states. There is no question that the CWA requires states to
make foster care maintenance payments because § 671(a)(1) conditions federal funding on compliance with § 672 in its entirety.
Although states are required only to maintain “substantial conformity” with the CWA’s provisions to avoid a loss of funding, the
individually tailored language in § 672(a)(1) suggests that state
compliance is not the focus of the foster care provision. The language in § 675(4)(A) is specific about the costs that foster care
maintenance payments must cover, and states that receive federal funding under the CWA must ensure that the payments they
provide to foster caregivers cover all of these costs. Moreover,
states are not free to decide which foster caregivers can receive
foster care maintenance payments. Taken together, § 672(a)(1)
and § 675(4)(A) go to great lengths to instruct states on the specific duties they must fulfill “on behalf of each child” eligible for
assistance.
Section 1983 enforcement of the CWA’s right to foster care
maintenance payments is crucial for preventing § 672(a)(1) from
becoming a “dead letter.”355 The CWA does not explicitly provide
aggrieved parties with a private right of action to enforce its provisions, and there is no federal review mechanism to fill this gap.
Asking the federal government to terminate funding to a state for
its failure to make adequate foster care maintenance payments
353 Conference Report on HR 11, Revenue Act of 1992, HR Rep 102-631, 102d Cong,
2d Sess 366 (1992).
354 Id.
355 See Wilder, 496 US at 514 (refusing “to adopt an interpretation of the Boren
Amendment that would render it a dead letter”).
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would most likely exacerbate the problem that foster caregivers
are trying to remedy. Thus, § 1983 actions are the most sensible
avenue for foster caregivers to enforce their right to adequate foster care maintenance payments and to ensure that the CWA protects the interests of children.
It is important not to lose sight of the lives that are affected
when states fail to comply with provisions of the CWA. Like any
other Spending Clause legislation that creates a federal-state cooperative program, the CWA surely regulates states by tying
funding to state compliance. But to reduce the entire statute to a
mere regulatory regime misses the point. As the name of the law
suggests, the overarching goal of the CWA is to improve the welfare of some of the most vulnerable children in the United States.
Foster children are undeniably the ones who suffer most when a
state fails to make adequate foster care maintenance payments,
and foster caregivers should be permitted to sue under § 1983 to
prevent this suffering. “[A]fter all,” Justice Blackmun admonished in his Suter dissent, “we are dealing here with children.”356

356

Suter, 503 US at 377 (Blackmun dissenting).

